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Canadian Pension Funds: Investments and Role
in the Capital Markets and Corporate
Governance
Poonam Puri* & P.M. Vasudev**
Most institutional investors have yet to seriously recognize the multiple im-
plications of their universal owner status, and to then develop programs
based on this understanding.
~ Hawley & Williams (2000)1
The article analyzes Canadian pension funds from the perspectives of corporate gov-
ernance and the capital markets. It reviews their investment allocations and revenue pat-
terns since the 1990s and identifies significant changes. The article finds that pension funds,
as shareholders, have turned more activist and they wield considerable influence on corpo-
rate governance. They also contribute to shaping public policy, as evident from the relaxa-
tion of the rules on foreign investment and the removal of restrictions on communications
among shareholders. The paper predicts that the role of pension funds will likely further
expand in the future, given the constant rise in their resources and increased awareness of
the need for responsible shareholder activism. Pension funds are ideally suited to be respon-
sible shareholders who can effectively engage with the corporations, particularly in the ar-
eas of director elections and promoting corporate accountability.
L’article traite des caisses de retraite canadiennes dans le contexte de la gouvernance
d’entreprise et des marche´s financiers. Les auteurs examinent la re´partition de leurs place-
ments et la source de leurs revenus depuis les anne´es 1990, et ils pre´sentent les principaux
changements survenus a` cet e´gard. Ils constatent que les caisses de retraite, a` titre
d’actionnaires, font de´sormais preuve de plus d’activisme et qu’elles exercent une influence
conside´rable sur la gouvernance d’entreprise. Elles contribuent e´galement a` l’e´laboration
des politiques publiques, comme en te´moignent l’assouplissement des re`gles visant les place-
ments e´trangers et l’e´limination des restrictions sur la communication entre les actionnaires.
Les auteurs affirment que le roˆle des caisses de retraite devrait s’accroıˆtre encore davantage
dans l’avenir, e´tant donne´ l’augmentation constante de leurs ressources et la sensibilisation
croissante des actionnaires a` l’activisme responsable. Les caisses de retraite sont ide´ale-
ment place´es pour eˆtre des actionnaires responsables, car elles peuvent agir de concert avec
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
** Sr. Lecturer, Department of Commercial Law, The University of Auckland, and Ph.D.
candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School York University, Toronto.
1 James P. Hawley & Andrew T. Williams, The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism: How Insti-
tutional Investors Can Make America More Democratic (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2000), Preface xvi.
248   BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [25 B.F.L.R.]
les socie´te´s, notamment en ce qui a trait a` l’e´lection des administrateurs et a` la promotion
de la responsabilisation de l’entreprise.
1. INTRODUCTION
Pension funds are large investors. Conventionally, they are understood as
providers of long-term or “patient” capital, particularly for infrastructure and other
project investments. Pension funds are a significant force in the capital markets,
and contribute to the development of the markets and new investment products.
Increasingly, pension funds also wield substantial influence over the governance of
the corporations in which they hold investments.
This article reviews Canadian pension fund investments and practices in the
recent decades.2 The analysis covers:
• Trends in investment allocations of pension funds and their significance.
• Impact on capital markets, including private equity and venture capital.
• Influence on corporate governance and the increasing activism of pension
funds as shareholders in corporations.
• Role in shaping public policy, evident from developments such as the
relaxation of the rules on foreign investments and the restrictions on com-
munications among shareholders.
The paper predicts that the role of pension funds is likely to further expand in
the future, given the constant rise in their resources and increased awareness of the
need for responsible shareholder activism. Pension funds are well-placed to play a
more effective role in matters such as director elections and promoting corporate
accountability. The analysis also reveals some gaps in the database of knowledge
about pension funds and their role. Future research in these areas can enhance the
capability of pension funds to contribute to the overall development of the capital
markets and corporate governance along healthy lines.
The paper has six parts. Part 2 reviews the asset allocation patterns of pension
funds and explains the changing contours of their investments. It notes the emerg-
ing trends in their investments growth of new avenues such as private equity and
venture capital. Part 3 examines the participation of pension funds in the capital
markets and their influence on the markets. It notes the recent trend increased reli-
ance of the funds on securities trade in the market to fund their pension obligations.
Part 4 analyzes the role of pension funds in shaping corporate governance. It
examines the initiatives taken by pension funds to foster good corporate govern-
ance and predicts the strengthening of this trend in the future. Part 5 examines how
pension fund activity is shaping public policy and influencing regulatory changes.
Part 6 concludes with a brief reference to the recent abortive effort of Ontario
Teachers’ Pension Plan (“OTPP”) and a group of investors to make a leveraged
buyout of Bell Canada. Such instances strengthen the expectations of greater activ-
ism among pension funds which are, arguably, the single largest class of investors.
2 The original research work for this article was done for the report “Pension Funds:
Trends in Asset Allocation and Role in Capital Markets, Corporate Governance and
Regulatory Policy” (2007), prepared for the Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions.
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2. PENSION FUND INVESTMENTS - ASSET ALLOCATION 
PATTERNS 
The investment patterns of pension funds have witnessed significant changes 
in the last two decades. These changes offer reasonably clear indications of the 
policy considerations and priorities of the funds. This part analyzes the patterns of 
asset allocation by Canadian pension funds during 1993-2006, and finds the 
following: 
Investment in the shares of public companies has remained more or less 
stable - around 40 percent of the total assets of the funds. 
Within this asset class, there has been a decline in Canadian holdings, 
which fell from 87 percent to 70 percent. Correspondingly, foreign hold-
ings rose from 13 percent to 30 percent. 
Fixed-income securities - particularly, bonds - have declined from 41 
percent to 32 percent of the assets of pension funds. 
(a) Asset Allocations 
In the 14 years between 1993 and 2006, the market value of the assets of trust-
eed pension funds in Canada almost tripled from $3.12 billion to $9.14 billion. The 
investments were in six major classes of assets - namely, bonds, stocks, mort-
gages, real estate, short-term and other assets. Of these, bonds and stocks are the 
largest asset classes. The allocations among the different classes are presented in 
Table 1. 
3 
Year 
1993 
1994 
Table 1 Market Value of Trusteed Pension Funds' Assets, 
1993-20063 ($Million) 
Total Real 
Assets Bonds Stocks Mortgages estate Short-term 
312,851 129,543 119,367 8,848 9,291 24,306 
310,720 121,588 119,962 8,210 10,458 25,212 
Other 
assets 
19,178 
23,161 
Statistics Canada. Table 280-0002 - Trusteed pension funds, market and book value 
of assets, by private and public sector category. CANSIM database, online: 
<http://estat.statcan.ca/cgi -win/cnsmcgi.exe ?Lang=E&EST A TFile=EStat\English 
\Cil_ l_E.htm&RootDir=ESTATI>. Statistics Canada has made a broad six-fold 
classification of assets by consolidating more detailed asset categories. The analysis in 
this paper is about the six assets classes used by Statistics Canada, which has provided 
the following notes to the data: 
1. From 1993, funds with assets of less than $5 million were exempted from 
providing details of their assets, and this limit was raised to $10 million in 
1998. Table 1 does not include the smaller funds for which asset breakup is 
not available. 
2. The data cover all trusteed pension funds registered with the provincial 
and/or federal regulatory authorities in Canada. 
3. "Short-term" assets include cash, deposits, Guaranteed Investment 
Certificates ("GICs") and short-term securities. 
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Total Real Other 
Year Assets Bonds Stocks Mortgages estate Short-term assets 
1995 358,023 139,387 144,938 8,175 12,084 23,909 27,251 
1996 419,664 150,979 185,110 8,423 12,356 25,018 35,382 
1997 467,201 172,144 205,811 8,217 13,622 22,351 43,228 
1998 513,151 194,033 210,342 8,104 15,176 27,669 53,211 
1999 564,464 194,297 252,274 8,612 17,521 25,600 63,573 
2000 599,266 221,678 239,342 9,066 25,160 27,393 72,182 
2001 581,529 209,854 232,675 9,750 28,962 31,490 69,142 
2002 557,108 203,284 208,477 9,215 32,927 30,418 69,037 
2003 625,896 216,599 247,224 9,540 31,633 30,348 86,155 
2004 693,733 239,041 266,638 10,612 34,978 31,172 106,813 
2005 799,649 266,685 317,540 11,515 44,403 36,442 118,878 
2006 914,971 295,694 375,246 13,120 55,887 26,439 144,680 
The investment patterns are much clearer when interpreted in percentage 
terms. The percentage trends of investment in the different asset classes are in 
Chart 1. 
Cha rt 1 
Trusteed Pension Funds' Asset Classes, 1993-2006 Asset Allocations 
as a Percentage of Total Assets 
50 ------------------·····---------···-----------------···· 
45 -r-~~~-. .... ~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
40 
.35 +---~::::::~~~=~-......:::::---
30 ........ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
~ 
C'\ 
C\ 
.... 
.,. 
U'l 
(j'I 
O'I 
.... 
1" ·1· 
\0 <X> 
(j'I C\ 
O'I O'I 
.... .... 
1" "T 1" 1" 
O'I 0 .... 
C'\ 0 0 
C\ 0 o . 
.... N N 
-Bonds 
--Stocks 
- Mortgage$ 
--Real Esta-re 
-short-Term 
- Other Assets 
CANADIAN PENSION FUNDS   251
Equities, as an asset class, have been quite stable at about 40 percent of the
total portfolio of pension funds in the 14-year period. This is less than half their
total investments. The data is at variance with the common notion that pension
funds are heavily invested in equities, which are believed to represent a large ma-
jority of their investments. Interestingly, the percentage of equity investments is
significantly higher for larger pension funds. Benefits Canada’s 2006 survey of the
“Top 100” pension funds found that their equity investments were over 54 percent
of the total value of their assets.4 Of this, Canadian equities were 26.4 percent and
foreign equities stood at 27.6 percent.
Considering the average of 40 percent equity investments reported by Statis-
tics Canada and the higher percentage for the large pension funds found in Benefits
Canada’s survey, possibly the equity investments of small funds were substantially
lower than those of the large funds. Another explanation could be the consolidation
of asset categories by Statistics Canada, which has six asset classes. Other agen-
cies — Benefits Canada and Pension Investment Association of Canada — have
more elaborate classifications of assets. Possibly, the consolidation of asset classes
by Statistics Canada has resulted in the lower percentage of stocks. For instance,
Statistics Canada has explained that “other assets” include miscellaneous pooled
vehicles, which may include stocks.
Bonds, mortgages and short-term assets experienced a decline in the portfolio
of pension funds. Bonds fell from about 41 percent of the total investments in 1993
to about 32 percent in 2006, and mortgages from 2.8 percent to 1.4 percent in this
period. “Short-term assets,” which is the third category of assets to diminish,
shrank from 7.8 percent to 2.9 percent. These assets are of the “fixed-income” vari-
ety and their decline can be explained by the fall in interest rates in the recent years.
The return on bonds, mortgages and short-term assets is calibrated to real interest
rates and during this period, real interest rates were quite low. To illustrate, the
yield on 6-months Treasury Bills of the Government of Canada fell from 6.78 per-
cent in 1993 to 3.67 percent in 2006.5
(b) New Asset Classes — Recent Developments
The “other assets” of pension funds shown in Table 1 climbed from 6.1 per-
cent in 1993 to almost 16 percent in 2006. Statistics Canada has explained that this
class includes investments in foreign and miscellaneous pooled vehicles, as well as
accruals and receivables. The increase in the “other assets” of pension funds has
been quite steady during the 14-year period, as shown in Chart 1. There was no
sudden jump in any year or block of years.
Pension Investment Association Canada (“PIAC”) provides useful information
on the investments of its member-funds. PIAC does not represent the full universe
of Canadian pension funds; even among its members, the data provided by PIAC
only cover those who reported the details of their investments. Statistics Canada’s
data, on the other hand, covers all trusteed pension funds. PIAC has a membership
4
“Top 100 Pension Funds”, online: Benefits Canada
<http://www.benefitscanada.com/news/article.jsp?content= 20060706_150017_3000>.
5 Bank of Canada. Treasury Bills — Average Yields — 6 Months, online:
<http://www.bank-banque-canada.ca/pdf/annual_page5_page6.pdf>.
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of 130 funds with over $892 billion under their management. This is a significant 
part of the pension fund industry, and the data provided by PIAC are helpful in 
understanding the trends. 
PIAC data are, in some respects, more detailed than those of Statistics Canada. 
PIAC has adopted a more elaborate classification of assets, which includes three 
significant asset classes - (a) venture capital and private equity, (b) hedge fund 
investments and (c) infrastructure. These have appeared in the recent years and 
PIAC members have made substantial investments in these classes. 
PIAC classified "venture capital and private equity" as a separate asset class in 
2000, and their value was about $8 billion in that year. They have since grown 
almost four-fold - to over $30 billion. Hedge-fund and infrastructure investments 
add up to another $40 billion. Probably these asset classes, which are not a part of 
Statistics Canada classification, are a reason for the substantial growth in the "other 
assets" of pension funds reported by Statistics Canada.6 PIAC data on investments 
in the additional classes of assets are in Table 2. They are interpreted in percentage 
terms in Chart 2. 
6 
7 
Table 2 New Asset Classes, 2000-2006 ($Million) 7 
Asset Class 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Venture capital 
and private 
equity 8,004 8,470 18,010 18,123 22,045 27,756 30,473 
Hedge fund 
investments 9,093 13,840 19,621 
Infrastructure 20,964 
Supra, Table 1. 
Asset allocations of member-pension funds, online: Pension Investment Association of 
Canada <http://www.piacweb.org/publications/index.html>. 
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Chart 2
New Asset Class Values as % of Total Assets (PIAC Data)
The new asset classes have been growing, both in absolute terms and as a
percentage of the total assets of pension funds. At over 8 percent in 2006, the new
classes are a significant component in the portfolios of pension funds. Their value
of over $70 billion in 2006 is quite impressive. The steady growth in venture capi-
tal and private equity in the recent years suggests that the trend may continue in the
future. These investments are, generally, not in market-traded securities of estab-
lished corporations, and pension funds will likely have a closer relationship with
the managements of the companies in which they make private equity or venture
capital investments. Dividend income from these investments would be an impor-
tant consideration and pension funds would likely have a greater engagement with
the companies to ensure their profitability.
(i) Private Equity and Venture Capital — The Emerging Investment
Trend
Pension funds have made substantial investments in private equity (“PE”) and
venture capital (“VC”) in the recent years. “Private equity” is a generic term that
refers to all forms of equity or quasi-equity investments where the securities are not
traded in the public capital markets. This broad asset class generally has three sub-
classes — namely, buyout capital, mezzanine capital and venture capital that have
distinctive meanings.
• Buyout funds are specialized private equity invested in established firms
undergoing a fundamental change in operations or strategy. Sometimes,
this could be for taking a public company private — as was attempted in
the leveraged buyout of Bell Canada by OTPP and other investors.
• Mezzanine capital is mainly subordinated debt or preferred stock convert-
ible into equity, and the purpose of investment is similar to buyout
funds — change in business strategy or operations.
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Venture capital, on the other hand, is meant for high-risk investment in 
new or young companies that promise significant growth. 8 
PE and VC investments are usually illiquid, as they are not traded in the stock 
market. Obviously, they require closer scrutiny and greater involvement of the pen-
sion funds, both in the pre-investment stage and subsequently. Available informa-
tion and data suggest the following conclusions: 
Larger pension funds tend to be more active in PE and VC, which re-
present a move away from the more traditional "stocks and bonds" model 
of investments. 
Lack of liquidity and the need for greater involvement probably deter 
smaller pension funds, with their limited resources and expertise, from 
venturing into the new areas. 
There is evidence that PE investments are often more profitable. The 
higher returns from PE would be an incentive for pension funds to in-
crease their investments in this segment. This is a likely explanation for 
the growing trend among large pension funds to invest in PE and VC. 
An empirical study of 146 Defined Benefit ("DB") pension plans in Canada, 
published in 2005, found that 39 of them had PE and VC investments.9 The aver-
age and median size of these 39 plans were significantly larger - more than twice 
that of the general pool of 146 plans. Quite obviously, PE and VC are preferred by 
the larger funds. The data are in Table 3. 
Table 3 DB Pension Funds Invest:ing In Private Equity and Venture Capital - A 
Comparison of Size ($Million (US)) 
Funds Included in the Study Funds Investing In Private 
Equity/Venture Capital 
Number of funds 146 39 
Average fund size 2,593 5,729 
Median fund size 681 1,501 
The relative median size of funds investing in PE and VC, at 2.2 times that of 
the general pool, is evidence of the preference of the large funds for the new invest-
ment classes. However, PE and VC were a relatively small part of the total invest-
ments of the 39 plans that had investments in these classes of assets. For private 
equity, the minimum allocation among the plans was 0.2 percent and the maximum 
was 7 percent. The average and median allocation are both less than 3 percent. The 
figures are even lower for venture capital. They ranged between a low of 0.2 per-
8 
9 
Glossary of Terms, online: Canadian Venture Capital and Private Equity Association 
<http://www.cvca.ca/resources/glossary .aspx>. 
Gilles Chemla, ''The Determinant:s of Investment in Private Equity and Venture Capi-
tal: Evidence from American and Canadian Pension Funds" (November 8, 2005), on-
Jine: <http://ssm.com/abstract=556421>. 
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cent and a high of just 3.7 percent, with median and average allocations of 1.4 
percent and 1.3 percent respectively. The allocations in percentage terms are pre-
sented in Table 4. 
Table 4 Pension Funds' Investment in Venture Capital and Private Equity- Relative 
Volume 
Description Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Investments as Percentage of Total 
Investments 
Private Equity Allocation - Average 2.4 
- Median 2.7 
- Minimum 0.2 
- Maximum 7.0 
Venture Capital Allocationge - Avera 1.3 
- Median 1.4 
- Minimum 0.2 
- Maximum 3.7 
The study, which was comparative, found that Canadian pension funds had a 
smaller part of their assets in PE and VC than their American counterparts. Gilles 
Chernla has offered the following as explanations for the difference in the ap-
proaches of Canadian and American funds. 
In the perception of Canadian fund managers private equity, as an asset 
class, is complicated and difficult to evaluate. Also, the investments re-
quire extensive monitoring. 
The less vibrant market in Canada for initial public offerings makes it 
difficult to get the securities listed and make the investments liquid. 
A 2007 survey of Canadian pension funds by MFC Global Investment Man-
agement is another source of information on their PE investments. IO The survey, 
which included PE under "real estate and alternative investments," found that alter-
native investments were more popular among larger pension plans, defined as plans 
with assets of over $1 billion. 1 This confirms the trend identified by Gilles 
Chernla. 
Among the pension plans surveyed by MFC, 8 percent had investments under 
the alternative category, and these investments represented 8 percent of their total 
assets. Among the smaller pension plans with assets of less than $1 billion, only 2 
percent had alternative investments, and the value of this class was 3 percent of 
their total assets. The relatively minor position of PE and VC can be explained by 
10 
II 
Trend Watch 2007: Attitudes and Intentions of Canadian Defined Benefit Pension 
Plans Towards Foreign Investment (foronto, ON.: MFC Global Investment Manage-
ment, 2007), at 3-4, online: <http://www.benefitscanada.com/pdfs/Reports_MFC.pdf>. 
Ibid. 
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the fact that they are late entrants. Hence, their value is not yet very significant in
the larger picture of total asset values.
Looking to the future, MFC stated that “net increases are mainly expected for
real estate and alternative investments using money shifting out of equities.” MFC
has further reported that “[a]lmost no respondents expect a decrease in plan alloca-
tion” for PE or VC.12 These asset classes are expected to benefit from the trend for
reducing investments in publicly traded equity. If the current bear phase in the
stock market continues, the preference for PE might strengthen in the future.
(ii) Private Equity and Venture Capital — Special Characteristics
Private equity and venture capital are significant new investment avenues for
pension funds. PE and VC investments require more detailed analysis and a closer
engagement of the pension funds. Pension funds that opt for such investments must
have the expertise for making the investment decisions and the time and resources
for active monitoring in the post-investment phase. The element of risk is also
greater with PE and VC investments, which are generally not liquid in the initial
stages.
These characteristics of PE and VC investments can explain the tendency of
larger pension funds to be more active in these areas. Greater resources, increased
need for diversified portfolios and availability of investment expertise are some
factors that encourage the large funds to be more active in new investments. En-
hanced risk and the need for closer engagement and greater oversight would not be
as forbidding for large funds as they would be for smaller pension funds.
PE and VC investments are likely to engender significant attitudinal changes
in pension funds. In dealing with the public corporations in which they hold shares,
pension funds have generally confined their focus to governance issues that are
structural. Investments in PE and VC, often for startup businesses, are a different
story. The special features of these investments, discussed above, are likely to en-
courage the funds to be more actively engaged with business and strategy. Quite
probably, the funds would play a greater role in matters like chief executive officer
appointment, selection of directors and advice on strategy. This would be a depar-
ture from the conventional approach of pension funds towards corporate govern-
ance, which has been marked by a general sense of hesitation and reluctance in
dealing with governance issues in public corporations.13
(iii) Comparative Returns
In 2006, David Mather found that 32 out of the top 100 pension funds in Can-
ada have private equity investments.14 Among them, OTPP is most active in pri-
vate equity. Mather analyzed the PE investments of three major pension funds —
OTPP, Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System (“OMERS”) and Caisse
12 Ibid., at 2.
13 These are discussed in Part 4, infra.
14 David Mather, “The Inner Workings of Private Equity” (August 2006), online: Benefits
Canada <http://www.benefitscanada.com/investments/alternative/article.jsp?content=
20060831_152120_5084>.
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de depot et placement du Quebec — and estimated that the return from PE has been
significantly higher than the returns from other segments in their portfolios. The
comparative returns estimated by Mather are presented in the graph below.
Chart 3
Comparative Returns from Private Equity and Other Asset Classes15
(c) Foreign Investments
Foreign holdings have increased, both in volume and importance, in the in-
vestments of pension funds. At 4.9 percent twenty years ago in 1988, foreign equity
holdings represented a relatively minor part of the assets of pension funds.16 By
2006, this figure crossed 30 percent of the total assets. Foreign holdings of pension
funds grew steadily during 1993–2006 as shown in Table 5 below.
15 Ibid.
16 Harry Weitz, The Pension Promise: The Past and Future of Canada’s Private Pension
System (Scarborough, Ontario: Carswell, 1992) at 278-279.
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17 
Year 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Table S Trusteed Pension Funds' Foreign and Canadian Holdings, 
1993-200617 ($Million) 
% of % of 
Tota l Canadian Total Foreign Total 
Assets Assets Assets Investments Assets 
310,534 269,194 86.7 41,340 13.3 
308,591 263,428 85.4 45,163 14.6 
355,718 299,734 84.3 55,984 15.7 
4 17,269 347,912 83.4 69,357 16.6 
465,372 381,822 82 83,550 18 
508,535 406,160 79.9 102,375 20. l 
561,877 448,451 79.8 113,426 20.2 
594,821 471,112 79.2 123,709 20.8 
581,873 453,684 78 128,189 22 
553,358 428,782 77.5 124,576 22.5 
621,500 475,672 76.5 145,829 23.5 
689,255 521,724 75.7 167,531 24.3 
795,463 591,602 74.4 203,861 25 .6 
911 ,066 632,959 69.5 278,107 30.5 
Table 280-0003 - Trusteed pension funds, market value of assets, foreign and 
Canadian, online: Statistics Canada, CANSIM database <http://estat.statcan.ca/cgi-
win/cnsmcgi.exe?Lang=E&ESTA TFile=EStat\English\CII_l _E.htm&RootDir= 
EST AT/>. Statistics Canada has provided the following notes to the data: 
1. Funds with assets less than $5 million up to 1998 and less than $10 
million after 1998 do not report their asset allocations, and are not included 
in the table. 
2. Data cover all trusteed pension funds registered with the provincial and/or 
federal regulatory authorities in Canada. 
3. "Short-term" includes cash, deposits, Guaranteed Investment Certificates 
(GICs) and short-term securities. Some may mature in more than 12 
months. 
4 . Canadian assets include investments in miscellaneous pooled vehicles, 
mortgages, real estate as well as accruals and receivables. 
5. Other foreign investments include investments in foreign pooled funds 
only. Foreign investments consist of investments in foreign pooled funds, 
stocks, bonds and short-term assets. 
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Obviously, there was growing enthusiasm among the pension funds for for-
eign investments. Foreign assets increased two-and-half times between 1993 and 
2006 - from 13.3 percent of total assets to 30.5 percent in 2006. Correspondingly, 
there has been a 17 percent decline in the holdings of Canadian assets, which fell 
from 86.7 percent in 1993 to 69.5 percent in 2006. This move away from domestic 
holdings to foreign holdings was enabled by the changes in the rules on foreign 
property. 
A ceiling of IO percent on foreign holdings was introduced in the early 1970s 
under what came to be known as the "Foreign Property Rule."18 The ceiling was 
raised to 20 percent in 199419 and to 30 percent in 2001. The rule was designed to 
make capital available for investment in Canada and, hopefully, reduce the cost of 
capital for domestic enterprises. The restrictions were opposed by many stakehold-
ers as not serving its intended purpose.20 Finally in 2005, the rule was abolished. 
Globalization and economic liberalization in the developing countries since 
the 1990s can be cited as another factor that stoked the interest of pension funds in 
overseas investments. Financial liberalization and the ability to invest in the emerg-
ing markets were important developments of the 1990s, and they quite obviously 
influenced the course of pension fund investments. 
In the early 2000s, pension funds were steadily moving towards the ceiling of 
30 percent applicable to foreign holdings. In 2006, immediately after the Foreign 
Property Rule was abolished, their foreign investments crossed the 30 percent level. 
This is consistent with the fact that many pension funds and PIAC had campaigned 
with the federal government for the removal of the Foreign Property Rule.21 The 
relative allocations in the different classes of foreign and Canadian assets are pre-
sented in the Table 6 and the percentages are in Chart 4. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Table 6 Pension Funds' Canadian and Foreign Holdings, 1993-2006 ($Million) 
Short-term 
Bonds Stocks Assets Other Assets 
Year Canadian Foreign Canadian Foreign Canadian Foreign Canadian Foreign 
1993 128,224 1,319 89,789 29,578 23,862 444 27,319 9,999 
1994 120,152 1,436 90,114 29,848 24,500 712 28,662 13,167 
1995 137,484 1,903 109,195 35,743 23,372 537 29,683 17,801 
1996 149,077 1,902 143,408 41,701 24,404 6 14 31,023 25,140 
Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c. 1, s. 206(1) [ITA] and Income Tax Regula-
tions, C.R.C., c. 945, s. 5000. 
Weitz, supra, n. 16 at 314 . 
For an analysis of the cost and benefits of the Foreign Property Rule, see David Bur-
gess & Joel Reid, ''The Foreign Property Rule: A Cost-Benefit Analysis" (2003), paper 
online: <http://economics.uwo.ca/faculty/fried/papers/fried-burgess-iipf.pdf>. 
This is discussed in Part 5, infra. 
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Year 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Table 6 Pension Funds' Canadian and Foreign Holdings, 1993-2006 ($Million) 
Short-term 
Bonds Stocks Assets Other Assets 
Canadian Foreign Canadian Foreign Canadian Foreign Canadian Foreign 
168,090 4,054 158,331 47,480 21,234 1, 117 34,167 30,899 
186,496 7,537 152,852 57,490 27,045 624 39,767 36,724 
189,960 4,337 190,840 61,434 24,861 739 42,790 46,916 
214,910 6,768 177,362 61,980 26,768 625 52,072 54,336 
205,377 4,477 163,039 69,636 30,500 990 54,768 53,086 
199,016 4,268 142,579 65,898 30,078 340 57,109 54,070 
212,763 3,836 170,394 76,830 29,844 504 62,670 64,659 
233,043 5,998 180,961 85,677 30,756 416 76,963 75,441 
258,320 8,365 203,561 113,979 35,656 786 94,065 80,731 
276,170 19,524 217,600 157,645 25,456 983 113,732 99,955 
Chart 4 
Pension Funds ' Canadian and Foreign Investments, 1993-2006 Asset 
Allocations % 
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Pension funds have shown a preference for equity and bonds, in that order. In 
dollar terms equity investments, both Canadian and foreign , showed a surge be-
tween 1993 and 2006. This is consistent with the bull phase in the stock market 
during the period. In percentage terms, foreign equity holdings grew significantly 
while Canadian holdings declined. Pension fund investment in foreign stocks has 
almost doubled - from 10 percent of the total assets in 1993 to over 17 percent in 
2006. In the same period, Canadian equity holdings declined from 29 to 24 percent. 
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Compared with equity, the growth in bond investments was slower. Holdings
of foreign bonds exploded after the abolition of the Foreign Property Rule in 2005,
more than doubling in 2006 — to over $19 billion from less than $9 billion in 2005.
In percentage terms, foreign bond holdings remained quite stable hovering between
0.4 and 1 percent, except in 2005-06 when they crossed 2 percent. Canadian bond
holdings declined from 41 percent in 1993 to 30 percent in 2006.
The foreign investments of pension funds rose in all asset classes except short-
term assets. This suggests that the funds preferred to keep their liquid assets in
Canada. Overall, there has been a steep fall in short-term assets, and this can also
be traced to the buoyancy in the stock market. With strong share prices, the pension
funds appear to have been less worried about liquidity and preferred to invest a
greater part of their resources in the capital markets.
“Other assets” also saw steady and significant increases. This was especially
true for foreign holdings, which rose from 3.2 percent in 1993 to 11 percent in
2006. Statistics Canada has noted that foreign investments included mainly pooled
funds. This suggests that in investing overseas, Canadian pension funds preferred to
be a part of larger arrangements rather than to act individually.
3. PENSION FUNDS — ROLE IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS
Pension fund holdings represented 21.7 percent of the domestic market capi-
talization of the Toronto Stock Exchange in 2004.22 This figure underscores their
importance in the capital markets. This part of the paper examines the impact of
pension funds on the capital market. The data and analysis draw the following
conclusions.
• Pension fund investments and trading enhances the efficiency, depth and
liquidity of the capital markets. The funds make substantial net purchases
of securities in the Canadian capital markets every year. Between 1993
and 2006, they made incremental investments of over $350 billion, net of
the securities sold by them during this period. Of this, $228 billion went
into Canadian securities and the remaining $122 billion were in foreign
securities.
• Pension funds derive their revenue both from capital gains on sale of in-
vestments and income from dividends and interest. Both sources of in-
come rose during 1990–2004. However, gains on sale of securities
emerged as the more important part of pension funds’ revenue. Pension
funds became more reliant on trade in securities than on the income from
holding the securities. Although profits from the sale of securities moved
in a fairly wide range, their enhanced importance in the revenue structure
of pension funds is unquestionable. The gains from sales, which repre-
sented less than 3 percent of the revenue in 1990, rose to a high of almost
54 percent in 2000, before falling to about 30 percent in 2004. Investment
22 Gil Yaron, “Acting Like Owners: Proxy Voting, Corporate Engagement and the Fidu-
ciary Responsibilities of Pension Trustees” (July 2005), Shareholder Association for
Research and Education Research Paper, online:
<http://www.share.ca/files/Acting_Like_Owners.pdf>.
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income showed a trend of decline — from over 58 percent in 1990, it fell
to less than 27 percent in 2004.
• The evidence is mixed when the performance of pension funds is com-
pared with broader market indices or other investment pools such as mu-
tual funds. There is no clear indication that pension fund investments sig-
nificantly outperformed the benchmarks.
• The presence of pension funds in the markets and their engagement with
the corporations can potentially enhance investor protection and public
confidence in the capital markets.
(a) The Ideal Attributes of Capital Markets
The following have been identified as some key attributes that enhance the
efficiency of the capital markets.23
• Maximizing liquidity — the assurance that non-cash assets can be con-
verted into cash with ease and certainty.
• Maximizing immediacy — the speed at which transactions can be com-
pleted in the market.
• Market visibility or transparency, as measures of the efficiency of the
trading system.
• Efficient price discovery — the process by which the market determines
trading prices for securities.
• Minimizing transaction costs for the investors in transactions of purchase
and sale of securities.
• Ensuring fairness in the market arrangements and minimizing principal-
agent conflicts between investors and market intermediaries.
• Ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the credit ring and settlement of
trades by delivery of securities and payment of the price.
• Maximizing the integrity of the market in the investors’ perception and
enhancing their confidence in the market processes.
By and large, securities law also shares these goals — for example, by provid-
ing enforcement that is essential for market integrity and investor confidence.24
Law and market institutions play complementary roles in promoting healthy and
efficient capital markets and their liquidity, depth and transparency. Equally, they
contribute to minimizing transaction costs and ensuring fairness and integrity in the
marketplace. Pension funds are sizable holders of securities and active traders.
23 Eric Kirzner, “Ideal Attributes of a Marketplace” in Canada Steps Up, final report of
the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, Vol. 4, at 99–125 (To-
ronto, ON.: Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, 2006), online:
<http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/V4(2)%20Kirzner.pdf>.
24 See generally Mark Gillen, Securities Regulation in Canada, 2nd ed. (Scarborough,
ON.: Carswell, 1998).
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They make an important contribution to the capital markets in Canada by strength-
ening the markets and their attributes.25 
(b) Pension Funds' Impact on Market Depth and Liquidity -
Purchases of Stocks and Bonds, 1994-2006 
As significant investors, pension funds quite naturally have a favourable im-
pact on the liquidity of the markets. Market liquidity is important for a number of 
reasons - mainly, the ability of issuers of securities to raise capital and for inves-
tors to sell their investments and convert them into cash. Eric Kirzner has described 
liquidity and its significance in the capital markets: 
In equity markets, liquidity may be defined as the market's capacity to ab-
sorb customers' buy and sell orders at or near the last sale price of a particu-
lar security. The greater the capacity to absorb customers' buy and sell or-
ders and the greater the number of orders and volume of shares that orders 
at or near the last sale price of a market can trade with little or no change in 
market price, the greater the market' s liquidity. Liquidity is measured by the 
depth of the bids and offers for a security in the market.26 
Pension funds receive regular and substantial cash inflows from ongoing con-
tributions by employers and employees. A large part of these resources are 
deployed in the capital markets. Pension funds make substantial net additions to 
their portfolios of stocks and bonds, as evident from the annual book values of their 
assets published by Statistics Canada.27 Interpreting the data, Table 6 presents the 
incremental investments of pension funds in stocks and bonds between 1994 and 
2006. The incremental values have been computed by deducting the sales made 
during the respective years from the opening book values.28 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Table 6 Net Purchases of Bonds a nd Stocks by Pension Funds, 1994-2006 
($Million) 
Net Acquisition of Net Acquisition of 
Year Bonds Stocks 
1994 6,334 9,413 
1995 4,387 14,724 
For a discussion on how institutional investors, in particular pension funds, contribute 
to the culture and character of capital markets, see E. Philip Davis, Pension Funds: 
Retirement-Income Security in Capital Markets - An International Perspective (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
Kirzner, supra, n. 23 at 109. 
Statistics Canada. Table 280-0002, supra, n. 3. 
The analysis here is subject to the caveat that there could be variations in the data 
reported by individual funds. For example, in some cases the book values of equity 
may be updated to reflect gains and losses, or the book value of bonds may be 
amortized. 
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Table 6 Net Purchases of Bonds and Stocks by Pension Funds, 1994-2006 
($Million) 
Net Acquisition of Net Acquisition of 
Year Bonds Stocks 
1996 9,194 19,712 
1997 19,939 17,759 
1998 22,294 12,713 
1999 14,141 9,199 
2000 18,882 11 ,472 
2001 -ll,054 16,138 
2002 -9,648 5,802 
2003 11 ,928 -2,104 
2004 19,392 8,579 
2005 23,014 32,615 
2006 32,198 36,41l 
Total 161,001 192,433 
Grand Total 353,434 
The net investment that pension funds made in stocks and bonds was over 
$350 billion between 1994 and 2006. This amount represents the additional re-
sources that pension funds brought into the market in this 13-year period. Pension 
funds made particularly large investments in stocks and bonds in the last two 
years - namely, 2005 and 2006. The purchases in these two years were over $124 
billion, or a third of the total for the 13-year period. These net figures have been 
computed by deducting the sales of stocks and bonds by the funds during the pe-
riod. Therefore, the gross purchases are likely to be even higher. 
Obviously, the large net purchases of securities by pension funds contribute 
significantly to the depth and liquidity of the capital markets. There is no data on 
the volume of trading by pension funds vis-a-vis overall trading volumes, as 
records of transactions by individual classes of investors are not maintained. In any 
event, pension funds are undeniably active traders in securities. Their trading activ-
ities contribute to market liquidity and benefit the entire securities industry infra-
structure. They add to the revenues and profits of the dealers and other market 
intermediaries and the large group of professional agencies that cater to the 
investors. 
Table 7 provides the Canadian and foreign breakup of the net investments 
made by pension funds in stocks and bonds during 1994-2006. 
Year 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Total 
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Table 7 Pension Funds' Net Purchases of Bonds and Stocks -
Canadian and Foreign, 1994-200629 ($Million) 
Net Purchases of Bonds Net Purchases of Stocks 
Canadian Foreiim Canadian Foreiim 
6,193 141 7,093 2,320 
3,991 397 12,028 2,696 
9,161 32 15,083 4,630 
17,851 2,088 14,817 2,941 
19,184 3,110 7,492 5,220 
16,619 -2,478 8,235 965 
17,002 1,880 3,517 7,957 
-8,731 -2,323 3,538 12,598 
-9,309 -340 -246 6,049 
11,980 -51 -2,800 694 
17,157 2,235 1,730 6,850 
20,520 2,494 5,490 27,125 
22,016 10,182 9,380 27,032 
143,634 17,367 85,357 107,077 
There is a significant difference between the patterns for stocks and bonds. For 
bonds, pension funds showed a bias in favour of Canada and less enthusiasm for 
foreign bonds. This pattern continued until 2005 when the Foreign Property Rule 
was abolished and the pension funds were no longer subject to restrictions on for-
eign investments. In the next yea - 2006 - their net purchase of foreign bonds 
leaped to over $10 billion from $2.5 billion in the previous year. Even after consid-
ering this, the overall net purchase of foreign bonds by pension funds was still less 
than 13 percent of their purchases of Canadian bonds. 
The story is quite different with stocks. Net purchases in Canadian stocks were 
significantly less than those of foreign stocks. Foreign stock purchases exceeded 
Canadian purchases for the first time in 2000, and this pattern continued in each 
subsequent year. In 2006, following the abolition of the Foreign Property Rule, 
29 Statistics Canada. Table 280-0003, supra, n. 17. Online: <http://estat.statcan.ca/cgi-
win/CNSMCGI.EXE?regtkt=&C2Sub=&ARRA YID=2800003&C2DB=EST &VEC= 
&HILITE=PENSION+FUNDS&LANG=E&Srch Ver=&Chunk:Size=50&SDDSLOC= 
%2F%2Fwww.statcan.ca%2Fenglish%2Fsdds%2F* .htm&ROOTDIR=ESTAT/ 
&RESUL TTEMPLATE=EST AT/Cil_?ICK&ARRA Y _PICK= l&SDDSID= 
&SDDSDESC>. 
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pension funds' purchase of Canadian stocks was just about a third of their 
purchases of foreign stocks. 
The trend in favour of foreign investments finds support from the 2007 survey 
of Defined Benefit plans by MCF, referred to earlier. The survey found that most 
funds planned to reduce their holdings of Canadian equities, and correspondingly 
increase their foreign equity holdings. However, the volume of change was ex-
pected to be less than 5 percent.30 The survey, conducted in the pre-credit crisis 
world, indicated further reductions in the holdings of Canadian equity by pension 
funds and rise in their foreign investments. It is not clear what impact the ongoing 
financial crisis and the instability in the stock markets worldwide will have on the 
habits of pension funds, particularly with respect to foreign investments. 
(c) Pension Funds ' Revenue Patterns -Trading Results and 
Investment Income, 1990-2004 
This section analyzes the data on the income of pension funds. There were 
significant changes in their revenue mix between 1990 and 2004. The period saw a 
decline in investment income31 - mainly interest and dividends - and a greater 
reliance on gains from sale of securities. Table 8 has the details of pension funds' 
revenues from 1990 to 2004, and they clearly illustrate the trends that developed 
during the period. 
30 
31 
32 
Table 8 Trusteed Pension Funds' Revenues, 1990-2004 ($Million)32 
End of Investment Net profit on Other Total Contributiom sales of year income 
se.curities revenue revenue 
Millions of dolla rs 
1990 10,294 15,908 664 417 27,282 
1991 11 ,675 15,683 2,360 332 30,050 
1992 12,657 15,639 3,643 759 32,699 
1993 14,008 16,124 9,559 828 40,519 
1994 13,646 16,858 7,080 834 38,417 
1995 14,064 18,009 9,790 582 42,445 
1996 13,482 18,888 18,889 3,490 54,750 
1997 13,314 19,185 29,847 1,295 63,641 
Trend Watch 2007, supra, n. 9 at 3-4. 
The investment income of pension funds would also include income from real estate 
and short-term assets. The entire amount cannot be attributed to dividend and interest 
on securities traded in the capital markets. 
Robert Anderson, "Trusteed Pension Plans and Funds, 1990 to 2004" in Canada's 
Retirement Income Programs (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2005). 
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End of Investment Net profit on Other Total Contributiom sales of year mcome 
securities revenue revenue 
Millions of dolla rs 
1998 12,949 20,416 23,466 3,835 60,666 
1999 13,713 21,778 25,439 1,386 62,316 
2000 12,296 23,670 47,219 4,436 87,621 
2001 16,568 21,901 8,309 17,080 63,858 
2002 19,409 20,892 1,697 7,444 49,441 
2003 26,189 24,361 10,499 1,935 62,984 
2004 29,674 25,463 28,193 12,289 95,589 
Net profit on sale of securities, with all its instability, became increasingly 
more important in the revenue structure. From less than 5 percent of the investment 
income in 1990, the profit on sale of securities grew steadily. But the growth until 
1995 was not as remarkable as it later became. In 1996, the gains from sale of 
securities surpassed investment income and this happened in five of the remaining 
eight years. Indeed in 2000, in the market peak before Enron and other corporate 
scandals and failures pulled down the market, the profit from sale of securities was 
almost double the investment income. Pension funds earned net profit of over the 
$226 billion from sale of securities during 1990-2004. The total investment income 
in this period was about $273 billion, which indicates the slight edge that invest-
ment income had. 
The pattern of pension funds' revenue and rise in gains from trade in securities 
points towards greater turnover in the portfolios of pension funds. This is a signifi-
cant shift, which weakens the conventional notions about pension as investors for 
the long-term and providers of "patient capital." If pension funds place increasing 
emphasis on trade in the market, that would make them more responsive to short-
term movements in share prices. This may have important implications for their 
role as shareholders and for the governance of the investee-corporations. A shorter 
investment focus by the pension funds would undermine their incentive for engage-
ment with the corporations. 
Table 9 provides the details of the profits and losses of pension funds from 
trade in securities during 1990-2004. 
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Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Total 
Table 9 Results of Pension Funds' Secur ities Trade, 1990-200433 
($Million) 
Net 
Profit from Trade Loss on Trade Profit/(Loss) 
1,490 826 664 
2,714 354 2,360 
3,882 239 3,643 
9,576 17 9,559 
8,127 1,047 7,080 
10,161 371 9,790 
18,890 1 18,889 
29,938 91 29,847 
23,803 337 23,466 
26,218 779 25,439 
47,276 57 47,219 
16,529 8,220 8,309 
14,644 12,947 1,697 
17,621 7,122 10,499 
28,333 140 28,193 
259,202 32,548 226,654 
The trading operations of pension funds have been generally profitable. This is 
not surprising considering that the market was in a bull phase. During the 15-year 
period, pension funds did not suffer net losses in any year. On the contrary, their 
profits rose consistently and substantially year after year until 2001. The profits 
earned by pension funds from trade in the market raise questions about the relative 
performance of their investments vis-a-vis other investors or benchmarks such as 
the TSX Composite Index. Tracking the movements in the total asset values of 
pension funds against the TSX Composite Index for the period 1991- 2004, Robert 
Anderson found mixed results. Chart 5 brings out the comparison.34 
33 
34 
Ibid. 
Ibid. The assets considered by Robert Anderson included capital market investments as 
well as other investments - namely, pooled, mutual and investment funds, mortgages, 
real estate, cash and short term. Anderson has relied, mainly, on the data from the 
Census of Trusteed Pension Funds which is comprehensive. He has supplemented them 
with the Quarterly Estimates of Trusteed Pension Funds, which is based on a smaller 
sample of the Census population. 
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Chart 5
Trusteed Pension Fund Asset Value versus TSX Composite Index A
Comparison of Percentage Change, 1991-2004
Out of the 14 years for which the data was compared, pension fund assets
outperformed the TSX Index in 7 years. In particular, the losses of pension funds
were significantly lower in 2001 and 2002 — years in which the stock market suf-
fered steep declines. Among the remaining 7 years, there was a tie in 2000 and the
TSX Index was higher in the other 6 years. The analysis does not suggest any clear-
cut efficiency or superiority in the performance by pension funds. Active manage-
ment of investments by pension funds does not appear to lead to results that are
significantly superior to more passive varieties, such as indexed investments. Tak-
ing a more generous view, pension fund investments appear to be less volatile than
the general market index and less subject to short-term fluctuations. This can be
cited as a positive feature of active investment management by pension funds.
Studies of U.S. pension fund investments and their efficacy vis-a`-vis general
index benchmarks reveal interesting results. Two studies, which considered the pe-
riod 1973–1982, concluded that DB plans underperformed the S&P 500 by 1.10
percent35 and by 0.44 percent36 per year. Pension plans’ performance apparently
worsened in the subsequent years; an analysis of data from 1983 to 1989 deter-
mined that the plans underperformed the S&P 500 by 2.5 percent a year.37
35 G. P. Brinson, R. Hood & G. L. Beebower, “Determinants of portfolio performance”
(1986) 44 Fin. Analysts J. 231.
36 R.A. Ippolito & J. A. Turner, “Turnover, fees and pension plans performance” (1987)
43 Fin. Analysts J. 16.
37 J. Lakonishok, A. Schleifer & R W. Vishny, “The structure and performance of the
money management industry” 1992 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity:
Macroeconomics 339, online:
<http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/files/ structure_performance.pdf>.
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Another set of studies show the opposite result. These studies found that pen-
sion funds outperformed index benchmarks. Early on in 1977, it was estimated that
that the average DB portfolio outperformed the S&P 500 by 1.44 percent per
year.38 This pattern was confirmed in a later work published in 1998.39 More re-
cently in 2006, it has been found that the average pension fund outperformed the
market by 1.24 percent after expenses.40 The recent years have seen a significant
increase in the analysis of pension funds’ investment performance.41
Either way, the two sets of analysis discussed above do not point towards
sharp or significant deviation in the performance of pension fund investments from
the index benchmarks. While one of them points towards a marginally superior
performance by the pension funds, the other strand affirms an equally marginal
inferiority on their part. Also, much of the data relate to periods in which share
prices were generally rising. In the last two years, the stock market has seen consid-
erable deflation, and this has important implications for pension funds. This is dis-
cussed a little later.
The decline in the position of investment income, shown in Table 8 above,
was matched by the increase in the gains from sale of securities. The relative signif-
icance of gains from trade in securities and investment income become more obvi-
ous when interpreted as percentages of the total revenues of pension funds. The
percentage figures are shown in Chart 6 below.
38 G. L. Beebower & G. L. Bergstrom, “A performance analysis of pension and profit-
sharing portfolios: 1966–1975” (1977) 33 Fin. Analysts J. 31.
39 J. A. Christopherson, W. E. Ferson & D. A. Glassman, “Conditioning manager alphas
on economic information: Another look at the persistence of performance” (1998) 11
Rev. Fin. Studies 111.
40 J. Busse, A. Goyal & S. Wahal, “Performance persistence in institutional investment
management” (July 2006), online:
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=890319>.
41 See e.g., K. Ambachtsheer, Pension Revolution: A Solution to the Pension Crisis (To-
ronto: John Wiley & Sons, 2007) at 236–238; W. Ferson & K. Khang, “Conditional
performance measurement using portfolio weights: evidence for pension funds” (2002)
65 J. Fin. Econ. 249; R. Wermers, “Mutual fund performance: An empirical decompo-
sition into stock-picking talent, style, transactions costs, and expenses” (2000) 55 J.
Fin. 1655; A. Khorana, H. Srvaes & P. Tufano, “Mutual Fund Fees Around the World”
(2007) HBS Finance Working Paper No. 901023, online:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=901023>.
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Chart 6
Investment Income and Profit on Sale of Securities as a Percentage
of Revenues, 1990-200442
The trend in investment income is clear. While increases in investments have
led to higher income in dollar terms, the relative importance of investment income
has been in decline. From over 58 percent of the total revenue in 1990, investment
income fell to just over twenty-five percent in 2006. The decline can be attributed,
at least in part, to fall in interest rates and reduced holdings of bonds by pension
funds discussed earlier.43 Another explanation could be the trend of falling divi-
dend payouts that has been identified in the United States.44 The yield on invest-
ments, or income as a percentage of the book value of the assets, declined from
5.94 in 1993 to 4.1 in 2004, as shown in the following graph.
42 Based on data in Anderson, supra, n. 32.
43 Supra, n. 5.
44 See for example, Eugene Fama & Kenneth French, “Disappearing Dividends: Chang-
ing Firm Characteristics or Lower Propensity to Pay” (2001) 60 J. Fin. Econ. 3. In
Canada, this trend draws support from a recent study by Stephen R. Foerster & Stephen
Sapp, “The Changing Role of Dividends: A Firm-Level Study from the Nineteenth to
the Twenty-First Century” (2006) 39 Can. J. Econ. 1316. Foerster and Sapp found that
investors’ perception of dividends has changed over time, allowing managements to
pay smaller dividends and reinvest funds in the corporations. There does not appear to
be any empirical study of the trend on dividend payment among Canadian corporations
in the recent decades.
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Chart 7
Yield on Trusteed Pension Fund Assets — 1993-200445
(d) Recent Decline in Share Values — Implications for Pension Fund
Solvency
Decline in the importance of investment income was accompanied, as noted
earlier, by a rise in the significance of gains from trade in securities. Trade gains
emerged as a major source of revenues for pension funds. In 2000 at the height of a
long bull market, the gains from the sale of securities, at 53.9 percent, represented
over half the total revenues of pension funds. They fell to lows of 13 percent and
less than 4 percent in the next two years in which the market deflated and share
prices fell. By 2004 however, the bull market had resumed and the gains from sale
of securities recovered to a level of almost 30 percent of the total revenue.
The recent instability in the stock market and swings in share prices are point-
ers to the perils in placing excessive reliance on trading transactions to derive reve-
nue. The unsteady course of the indexes is fresh evidence of the systemic risks in
the financial markets. From a high of 15,128 in May 2008, the TSX Composite
Index fell more than 47 percent to a low of 7,997 in March 2009. By June 2009, it
had recovered to an average high of 10,374.46
The recent decline in share values in the stock market placed pension funds
under considerable stress. The problem has been especially acute for DB plans
whose payment obligations are fixed. A recent survey of DB plans found a worsen-
ing of the gap between their asset base and pension liabilities. The solvency gap for
DB plans since December 2007 is shown in the graph below.
45 Yield has been computed by measuring the investment income of pension funds against
the book value of their assets for the respective years, per Statistics Canada, Table 280-
0002, supra, n. 3.
46 Data from Yahoo Canada Finance, online: <http://ca.finance.yahoo.com>.
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Chart 8
Solvency of Defined Benefit Plans47
From over 95 percent in December 2007, the solvency ratio plummeted to less
than 70 percent a year later in December 2008. According to a latest estimate, the
position has since improved and the solvency is 75 percent at the end of June
2009.48 It is not clear whether share prices will regain the lost ground and help the
pension funds in reaching the condition of near-complete solvency that existed at
the end of 2007. The bear phase in the stock market has come as a “double-
whammy” for the pension funds, which have been hit by fall in the yield on their
investments.
4. PENSION FUNDS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
As large shareholders, pension funds have tended to expand their role in the
governance of the corporations in which they hold investments. This part reviews
pension fund engagement in corporate governance and finds the following:
• Canadian pension funds have attempted systemic and concerted action to
promote good governance of public corporations. The CCGG, which was
launched by the large pension funds in 2002, is a prominent example of
this trend. The CCGG regularly tracks issues related to pension fund in-
vestments and provides policy guidelines to its members. PIAC is another
agency that plays a similar role and enhances the capability of its mem-
bers to be effective shareholders.
47 Watson Wyatt Worldwide. “The Solvency of Canadian Pension Plans Plummets in
2008, Watson Wyatt’s Pension Barometer Finds” (8 January 2009), online:
<http://www.watsonwyatt.com/news/press.asp?ID=20364>.
48 Janet McFarland, “Pension funds turn the corner” The Globe and Mail (9 July 2009)
B4.
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• The involvement of institutional investors, including pension funds, in
corporate governance has myriad implications, both positive and nega-
tive. On the positive side, funds are in a position to effectively influence
corporate managements and promote accountability. Consultation is the
common instrument used by pension funds; more confrontational meth-
ods such as threat of litigation and exit are less prevalent. The negatives
include the tendency of some funds to free-ride on the initiatives of
others and conflicts of interests for pension fund managers who are de-
pendent on corporate managers for business. There is also the “agency
problem” that arises from the fund managers’ lack of proprietary interest
in the funds under their control.49
• Pension funds in Canada rely more on informal discussions with corpo-
rate managers for resolving governance issues. The general preference is
to avoid confrontational methods such as negative voting, litigation or
proxy campaigns. This trend has continued substantially in the recent
years. However, there are instances of more activist intervention, includ-
ing litigation by the funds against managements.
• Seeking directorship in corporations has not been high on the agenda of
pension funds. This might, however, see some changes with the increas-
ing investments in private equity and venture capital discussed earlier.
• The available data on shareholder proposals do not suggest that pension
funds actively use this instrument for intervention in corporate
governance.
• Pension funds normally delegate the task of proxy voting to their fund
managers. There is, however, an increasing trend for the funds to provide
instructions to the managers on proxy voting. Consistent with their pref-
erence to avoid confrontations, most funds cast their votes with the man-
agements of the corporations.
(a) Pension Fund Initiatives to Promote Good Corporate Governance
The last few years have seen increased pension fund activism to promote good
governance in the corporations in which they hold shares. This section reviews the
initiatives taken by Canadian pension funds in this regard. Pension funds, in partic-
ular OTPP and its chief executive officer Claude Lamoreux, were instrumental in
49 The earliest exposition of the agency problem in corporate organizations — namely,
control of the resources of a large number of persons by a small group, was by Adam
Smith, An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nation (1787) (New
York: The Modern Library, 1937) at 700. The same theme animated Adolf A. Berle &
Gardiner C. Means’ The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: Mac-
millan Company, 1932). More recently, the agency discourse is traced to Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure” (1976) 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305.
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launching the CCGG in 2002. The CCGG, which encourages pension funds to en-
gage with the corporations, has defined its mission in the following terms: 
Representing the interests of institutional shareholders, the Canadian Coali-
tion for Good Governance promotes good governance practices in Canadian
Public Companies and the improvement of the regulatory environment to
best align the interests of boards and management with those of their share-
holders, and to promote the efficiency and effectiveness of the Canadian
capital markets.50
The CCGG currently has 41 members with assets of over $1 trillion.51 The
membership of CCGG has a large presence of fund managers. The CCGG has de-
veloped guidelines on corporate governance practices, executive compensation and
majority voting.52 Significantly, CCGG has also prepared a discussion paper on the
“break fees” or “termination fees” payable by target corporations to unsuccessful
bidders in friendly takeover bids that have the support of target companies’ man-
agements. This is, perhaps, a pointer to pension funds becoming more active in
takeovers and change of corporate control.53
In November 2006, David Beatty, the Managing Director of CCGG, stated
that the efforts of the CCGG to promote good corporate governance have been ef-
fective, and that governance risk ratings for corporations declined from over 35
percent in 2002 to 26 percent in 2005.54 CCGG has gained significantly in stature
since its launch and is active in promoting institutional investor engagement with
corporations.
PIAC is a much older alliance, specifically comprising pension funds. It was
established in 1977 and has over 130 members representing $892 billion in as-
sets.55 PIAC, which also encourages its members to engage with the corporations,
has developed its own set of Corporate Governance Principles and Guidelines.56
The governance initiatives of CCGG and PIAC represent the efforts of pen-
sion funds, at the industry-level, to promote shareholder engagement and good cor-
porate governance. Other than such collective efforts, individual pension funds —
in particular, large funds such as the OTPP — have been actively engaged with the
50 Canadian Coalition for Good Governance, Mission and Mandate, online:
<http://www.ccgg.ca/about-the-ccgg/mission-and-mandate/>.
51 The membership of CCGG is quite mixed. Other than mainstream pension funds such
as Canada Pension Plan (“CPP”) and Ontario Pension Board (“OPB”), there are a large
number of fund managers — for example, CIBC Global Asset Management and TD
Asset Management. Online: CCGG <http://www.ccgg.ca/membership/members-list/>.
52 Ibid. Guidelines and principles, online: <http://www.ccgg.ca/guidelines/>.
53 A prominent example is the recent high-profile efforts made by OTPP for a leveraged
buyout (“LBO”) of Bell Canada.
54 Online: CCGC <http://www.ccgg.ca/media/files/speeches/David%20Beatty%20%2D
%20Luncheon%20Address.pdf>.
55 Pension Investment Association of Canada, online: <http://www.piacweb.org/>.
56 PIAC Corporate Governance Principles and Guidelines, online: <http://www.
piacweb.org/files/PIAC%20Corporate%20Governance%20Principles%20and%20
Guidelines%20may%209%2007.pdf>.
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corporations in recent years. For a number of reasons discussed here, pension fund
activism in corporate governance is likely to strengthen in the future.
(b) Pension Funds and Corporate Governance — An Overview
The role of institutional investors in corporate governance has been a promi-
nent issue at least since the 1970s. Interest in the role of Institutional investors,
among whom pension funds are a preeminent group,57 was triggered by judicial
decisions in the United States, such as Blankenship v. Boyle (1971),58 and literature
on the subject. Peter Drucker published The Unseen Revolution: How Pension
Fund Socialism Came to America59 in 1976 and Rifkin and Barber’s The North
Will Rise Again: Pension, Politics and Power in the 1980s60 appeared in 1978.
These works turned the focus on pension funds, which continued to be a topic of
interest through the 1980s. Significant contributions came from scholars such as
John Langbein and Richard Posner (1981).61 There were also calls for federal regu-
lation of pension fund investments.62
In the 1990s, the enthusiasm about institutional investors was even greater.63
A mood of optimism was dominant, and scholars such as Bernard Black (199064
and 199265), John C. Coffee, Jr. (1991)66 and Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman
(1991)67 expected that institutional investors would contribute significantly to the
governance of public corporations. They pointed out that institutional investors
were well-placed to effectively monitor corporate managements, and that would
57 There are, however, significant differences between pension funds and other institu-
tional investors such as mutual funds. By definition, pension funds must take a medium
and long-term view of their investments and their concern for the short-term ought to
be less. These considerations would, normally, result in the differences between the
approach of pension funds and many other categories of institutional investors.
58 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C.) (1971).
59 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1976).
60 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978).
61 See for example, John H. Langbein.& Richard A. Posner. “Social Investing and the
Law of Trusts” (1981) 79 Mich. L. Rev. 72. The authors were essentially critical of
“social investments” by institutional investors, but their work is evidence of the grow-
ing interest in institutional investors and their practices.
62 Kathleen Paisley, “Public Pension Funds: The Need for Federal Regulation of Trustee
Investment Decisions” (1985) 4 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 188.
63 Some of the studies discussed below were about institutional investors in general, and
not pension funds in particular. Pension funds have always been a major part of institu-
tional investors and the findings are quite relevant for them.
64
“Shareholder Passivity Re-examined” (1990) 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520.
65
“The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring” (1992) 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 895;
“Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice” (1992) 39
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 813.
66
“Liquidity v. Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor” (1991) 91
Colum. L. Rev. 1277.
67
“Re-inventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors” (1991) 43
Stan. L. Rev. 863.
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lead to better value for the corporations — both business profits and higher share
prices in the stock market. The writings reflected the concerns of the law and eco-
nomics movement that was particularly influential during the 1980s and 1990s. It
was the “shareholder value” era, and quite understandably, capital markets and
share prices dominated the discourse on institutional investors and their impact on
corporate governance.
There were, however, other voices that were less sanguine about institutional
investors and their ability to play a meaningful role. William O’Barr and John M.
Conley (1992), who studied nine large pension funds, found that their fund manag-
ers were quite conservative and preferred to avoid personal responsibility for deci-
sions.68 The eagerness of the managers to adopt investment strategies like indexing
meant that there was little need for individual assessment of investment opportuni-
ties and selection based on the assessment. Roberta Romano (1993) was also skep-
tical of the institutional investors being effective shareholders.69
Sunil Wahal (1996) questioned whether pension fund activism led to higher
valuations for the target companies.70 Wahal studied the corporations in which nine
large pension funds, including California Public Employee Retirement System and
Colorado Public Employee Retirement System were active between 1987 and 1993.
On reviewing the mechanisms used by pension funds used for intervention, the
study found that the funds were reasonably successful in ushering in changes in the
governance structure of the corporations. The success rate of the pension funds was
determined at 40 percent. On another note, Wahal found no “abnormal” share price
returns in these corporations that pension funds targeted for activism. Bernard
Black, who was earlier optimistic about institutional shareholder activism, con-
cluded in 1998 that the effect of institutional investors on performance is not signif-
icant.71 The concern of Black was with share prices as the barometer of corporate
performance.
In Canada, Jeffrey MacIntosh (1993) shared the contemporary optimism of
Bernard Black (1990) and John Coffee (1992) that institutional investors would
have a positive effect on corporate governance.72 MacIntosh predicted that the “rise
of the institutional investor is likely to improve monitoring of corporate manag-
ers.”73 To facilitate them to play an activist role, he proposed a number of regula-
tory measures, such as protecting fund managers against pressure from corporate
68 Fortune and Folly: The Wealth and Power of Institutional Investing, (Homewood, Illi-
nois: Business One Irwin, 1992); “The Culture of Capital: An Anthropological Investi-
gation of Institutional Investment” (1992) 70 N.C.L. Rev. 823.
69
“Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered” (1993) 93
Colum. L. Rev. 795.
70 Sunil Wahal, “Pension fund activism and firm performance” (1996) 31 J. Fin. & Quan-
titative Analysis 1.
71 Bernard S. Black, “Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United
States” in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, vol. 3, at 459–465,
1998, online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=45100> or DOI: <10.2139/ssrn.45100>.
72
“The Role of Institutional and Retail Investors in Canadian Capital Markets” (1993) 31
Osgoode. Hall L. J. 371.
73 Ibid., at 371.
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managers and facilitating shareholders to communicate among themselves without
triggering proxy procedures.74
In 1992, a survey of over 100 institutional investors in Canada found increased
awareness about corporate governance.75 In particular, large public sector pension
funds tended to be activist. The case was quite different with smaller private sector
ones, which were more likely to be passive.
Writing about institutional investors again in 1996, Jeffrey MacIntosh con-
cluded that, by and large, experience affirmed his earlier optimism that they would
make a positive difference to corporate governance. Recounting the experience,
MacIntosh identified some positives in activism by the institutional investors and
the negatives associated with it.76
(i) Institutional Investor Activism — Positive Factors
• Acting in unity, institutional shareholders can act as a check against con-
trolling shareholders. Even if the institutional shareholders are unable to
pass or defeat ordinary resolutions that require a simple majority of votes,
they could still be effective in dealing with special resolutions that re-
quire two-thirds majority.
• Institutional investors have significant powers of moral suasion and are
well-fitted to play the role of diplomats and critics.
• Institutions, with their resources, are more likely to sue erring manage-
ments than private or retail investors.
• Through the exercise of dissent rights and the exit option, institutional
investors can send strong signals to managements and act as a restraining
force.
• Institutional investors can play a significant role in spurring legislative
change.
(ii) Institutional Investor Activism — Negative Factors
• Activist institutional investors might be deterred by the problem of free-
riding by other investors.
• Agency problem and the lack of proprietary interest are equally applica-
ble to institutional investors that are themselves managed by profession-
als under fiduciary duties. They would be less effective in overseeing
corporations managed by another set of fiduciaries.
74 The difficulties created by the restrictive proxy rules were a longstanding issue, and
they have since been amended. This is discussed in Part 5 below.
75 Kathryn E. Montgomery, “Survey of Institutional Investors” (1992) 4 Corp. Gov. Rev.
5. See also Jeffrey Larsen, “Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance and Proxy
Voting Disclosure” in Puri & Larsen, eds., Corporate Governance and Securities
Regualtion in the 21st Century (Toronto: Butterworths, 2004).
76 Jeffrey MacIntosh, “Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in Canada”
(1996) 26 Can. Bus. L.J. 145.
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• Fund managers are usually dependent on corporate managers for busi-
ness. Fear of losing business could make them reluctant to be seen as
overactive in their monitoring role.
• Corporate managers and directors often act as trustees or directors of pen-
sion funds. The resulting conflicts of interests might tempt the corporate
executives to invest the funds in their own companies.
• Nonvoting shares and lack of voting rights are another issue. Institutional
investors holding nonvoting shares would be less effective monitors.
• Sometimes, institutional investors could be under political pressure not to
take certain actions — for example, on the ground that they would
weaken the economy. This could inhibit the funds from taking action
they might consider appropriate in the interests of the investee-corpora-
tion and the beneficiaries of the fund.
• The monitoring capability of institutional investors is subject to systemic
limitations, human and financial.
• The imperatives of liquidity would place institutional investors — in par-
ticular, mutual funds — under conflicting pressures.77
• Legal restraints on institutional activism, such as the rule on proxies
(which has since been amended), discourage communication among the
shareholders and weaken their efficacy.
• The dominant culture of passivity among institutional investors makes it
difficult for them to achieve changes.
• A fear of political backlash in the form of greater regulation of institu-
tional investors could deter activism.
• By sending negative signals about particular corporations, institutional
investors could trigger a “race for exit” among the shareholders.
• Systemic difficulties such as lack of contact details might hamper the
ability of institutional investors to communicate with other shareholders.
• Institutional managers are as vulnerable to short-termism as their counter-
parts in the corporations.
The discourse on shareholder activism by pension funds started on a note of
strong optimism. It has since been tempered by the reality of experience over the
last two decades. It would be unrealistic to expect pension funds to radically trans-
form the position and role of shareholders in contemporary corporate governance.
Yet it is obvious that pension funds and other institutional investors have produced
a favourable impact on the governance climate. This much is conceded by scholars
like Allan Hutchinson who complain that institutional investors have not lived up
77 This would not be equally relevant for pension funds, which are supposed to be more
concerned with the medium and long term. However, their increased reliance on gains
from trade transactions, discussed earlier, exposes their vulnerability in this regard.
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to their potential.78 More empirical research on shareholder activism by pension
funds can be valuable in understanding the recent trends.
(c) Institutional Investor Activism in Canada
The shareholding patterns in public corporations in Canada are distinctive.
They are different from the United States which is characterized by widely-held
public corporations in which no single shareholder or an identifiable group of
shareholders have controlling power. This is quite unlike the situation in Canada.79
In 1998, the latest year when the subject was examined, it was found that almost
half the top 100 listed corporations in Canada were under the control of a family or
an identifiable group of shareholders. Another quarter was foreign-controlled, and
only the remaining quarter comprised widely-held corporations that had no control-
ling shareholders.80 This fact must inform any study institutional on investor activ-
ism in the Canadian context.
The presence of a controlling group of shareholders, which is often the case in
Canada, would be a significant factor. It can have an impact on activism by other
shareholders including institutional investors. Outside shareholders would likely be
less effective in such corporations than in the typical widely-held corporations that
have no controlling shareholders. In a confrontation, the controlling shareholders
can override the wishes of the institutional investors.81
Culture is another factor. Jeffrey MacIntosh (1993) has pointed out the prefer-
ence in Canada for less confrontational approaches: 
In Canada’s tightly knit financial community, much institutional “activism”
has taken the route of quiet, behind-the-scenes, diplomacy, whereby institu-
tions meet privately with managements in order to make their views
known.82
78 The Companies We Keep: Corporate Governance for a Democratic Society (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2005), Chapter 9, “The Age of Institutions: Rise and Ruse?”
79 For a summary of the characteristics of the capital markets in Canada and important
statistics, see Chris Nicholls, “The Characteristics of Canada’s Capital Markets and the
Illustrative Case of Canada’s Legislative Regulatory Response to Sarbanes-Oxley”
(June 2006) in Canada Steps Up, (Final report of the Task Force to Modernize Securi-
ties Legislation in Canada, Toronto, ON.), Vol. 4: Maintaining a Competitive Capital
Market in Canada, online: <http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/V4(3A)%20Nicholls.pdf>.
80 Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, “Some Obstacles to Good Corporate Governance in
Canada and How to Overcome Them” (August 2006) in Canada Steps Up, (Final re-
port of the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, Toronto, ON.).
Vol. 4: Maintaining a Competitive Capital Market in Canada, online:
<http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/V4(5)%20Morck.pdf>.
81 In such cases, the outvoted minority can invoke the oppression remedy (Canada Busi-
ness Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 241). However, the oppression remedy
is designed for remedying specific grievances, rather than an instrument for promoting
inclusive corporate governance on an ongoing basis.
82 MacIntosh, supra, n. 72 at 381.
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More recent evidence of the preference for a relational approach and dialogue
is seen in the statements of the CCGG. In its 2004 annual report, CCGG cautioned
against aggressive or confrontational methods: 
We [the Coalition] will continue to “walk softly and carry a big stick”. We
walk softly, preferring to do our work outside of the media glare. The
“stick” we carry really belongs to our members who, should they be un-
happy about the governance progress at any particular company, may
choose to speak publicly or vote their shares accordingly.83
This is not to suggest that there has not been any confrontation by pension
funds. Jeffrey MacIntosh (1996) explained how institutional investors were instru-
mental in defeating dual class recapitalizations proposed in Crownx, Seagrams and
Canadian Tire, and the poison pill provision in Labatt.84 More recently, important
lawsuits were filed by OTPP against Nortel Networks Corporation (“Nortel”) and
OMERS against Ford Canada.85
There are reports pension fund managers are holding discussions with the cor-
porations. Such meetings provide an informal mechanism for intervention in is-
sues,86 and they support the thesis about the preference of pension funds for non-
confrontational approaches. Claude Lamoureux, former chief executive officer of
OTPP, reportedly commanded substantial respect when he raised governance issues
and was usually able to get them resolved.87 Another instance of pension fund ac-
tivism is seen in the practice of Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (“CPPIB”)
to seek information from corporations on environmental issues and risks.88
(d) Shareholder Activism by Pension Funds — Its Dimensions
Pension funds have a number of avenues for engaging with the corporations
and being active shareholders. Representation on corporate boards, litigation
against managements, initiating and/or supporting shareholder proposals and proxy
voting would be the major instruments for shareholder activism. These are dis-
cussed below. The analysis reveals an increase in activism by pension funds in
recent years, a trend that will probably continue.
83 Corporate Governance Principles and Guidelines (May 2007) at 3, online: Canadian
Coalition for Good Governance <http://www.ccgg.ca/media/files/annual-
reports/CCGGAnnualReport2005.pdf>.
84 MacIntosh, supra, n. 76 at 173.
85 Litigation by pension funds is discussed a little later.
86 See for example, the statements of Claude Lamoreux, chief executive officer of OTPP
in Elizabeth Church, “Cleaning up corporate governance, one company at a time” The
Globe and Mail (27 June 2005) B5.
87 See for example, Derek Decloet, “Why teachers won’t be preachers” The Globe and
Mail (6 September 2007) B2.
88 Shawn McCarthy, “Assess climate risks, firms urged” The Globe and Mail (31 October
2007) at B3.
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(i) Representation on Boards of Directors
Representation on boards is a direct form of activism. Board position provides
a vantage point and the opportunity to participate in governance. Equally, it entails
significant responsibilities — at least in theory.89 There is empirical evidence that
pension fund managers tend to be quite conservative.90 Consistent with this, gener-
ally pension funds have been not enthusiastic about board positions in corporations.
The 1992 survey of Canadian institutional investors, referred to earlier, found that
“most institutions shied away from board representation, citing the conflict-of-in-
terest that could arise from ‘wearing two hats.’”91
The Memotec episode of early 1990s can be cited as another instance of pen-
sion funds’ reluctance to seek positions on corporate boards. Caisse de depot et
placement du Quebec and OMERS, which are both public sector funds and re-
garded as more activist, had a dispute with the management of Memotec. In the
efforts to put an end to the dispute, the two funds helped Gordon Capital Corp.,
another institutional shareholder, to place independent directors on Memotec’s
board.92 Significantly, the pension funds did not play a more direct role — such as
placing their nominees on the board of Memotec.
Some signs of change are visible in the recent years. Large pension plans,
notably OTPP and OMERS, have started making outright acquisitions of compa-
nies,93 and this gives them direct responsibility for the business. The new culture
was visible in 2007 when Jim Leech, the incoming chief of OTPP, made the an-
nouncement about the appointment of George Cope as the chief executive officer
of Bell Canada.94 In October 2008 when OTPP announced the acquisition of
Aquilex, its chief executive officer stated that the management is “excited to have
Teachers’ on board and . . . look[s] forward to working together to further increase
Aquilex’s long-term value.”95
89 The efficacy of the directors has always been controversial. A number of American
studies found significant weaknesses in the theory and reality of the directors of public
corporations. See e.g., Myles Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality (Boston, MA.:
Harvard Business School, 1971) and more recently, Paul W. MacAvoy & Ira M. Mill-
stein, The Recurrent Crisis in Corporate Governance (Stanford, CA.: Stanford Busi-
ness Books, 2004).
90 O’Barr & Conley, supra, n. 68.
91 Montgomery, supra, n. 75, cited in Kathryn E. Montgomery, “Market Shift — The
Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance” (1996) 26 Can. Bus. L. J. 189
at 195.
92 See MacIntosh, supra, n. 72 at 378.
93 For example in 2008, OTPP announced two business acquisitions — an American ser-
vice company, Aquilex and an electricity business in Chile. Ontario Teachers Pension
Plan, news releases, online: <http://www.otpp.com/wps/wcm/connect/
otpp_en/Home/Newsroom/News+Releases/2008/>.
94 Wojtek Dabrowski, “Cope tapped to be BCE’s post-buyout CEO” (17 October 2007),
online: Reuters
<http://www.reuters.com/article/innovationNews/idUSWNAS679720071017>.
95 Ontario Teachers Pension Plan, news release “Teachers’ Private Capital acquires
Aquilex, U.S.-based industrial cleaning, repair service company,” Toronto, 6 October
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Greater involvement in business and strategy appears to be the trend for the
future, given the increasing investments in venture capital and private equity. In
these investments, pension funds would not have ready liquidity and would rely
more on business profits and dividends. Even for public corporations, the recent
decline in share prices would encourage the funds to pay greater attention to busi-
ness profits and the stream of income from dividends.
(ii) Litigation by Pension Funds
As large investors with sizable resources, pension funds are better placed than
retail investors to litigate with corporate managements on specific issues. The re-
cent experience with pension funds suggests that they are now more ready to take
the litigation route. The case was different earlier. In 1995, the Allen Committee on
Corporate Disclosure established by Toronto Stock Exchange described the prevail-
ing attitudes: 
Institutional investors admitted that they would be loath to sue a company
for misleading disclosure. Several reasons were cited for this stance. Institu-
tions are reluctant to draw attention to investment “mistakes.” Institutions
do not wish to pour extensive resources (management time, money and ex-
pertise) into a lengthy litigation process when resources can be more fruit-
fully employed targeting new investment opportunities. Finally, institutions
prefer to deal with sensitive issues such as disclosure practices in a far less
confrontational and more private manner. Often discussions with the man-
agement on such issues are productive.96
The number of significant cases that institutional investors have filed against
corporations since 1996 has been estimated at 12.97 Of these, one was filed by
OMERS against Ford Motor Co.98 OMERS invoked the oppression remedy to as-
sail Ford’s pricing system by which most of the profits of the Canadian subsidiary
were transferred to the American parent. The court recognized oppression, but
OMERS was denied relief on a technical ground — namely, the oppressive prac-
tices had occurred before OMERS bought shares in the company. Recently, Iron-
workers Ontario Pension Fund filed a suit against Research in Motion (“RIM”)
2008, online: <http://www.otpp.com/wps/wcm/connect/otpp_en/home/newsroom/
news+releases/2008/aquilex>.
96 TSE Committee on Corporate Disclosure (Thomas I.A. Allen, Chair), cited in John
Chapman, “Institutional Activism: Current Trends and Emerging Legal Issues” (2007)
44 Can. Bus. L. J. 327, at 333.
97 Chapman, ibid., at 335–338.
98 Ford Motor Co. of Canada v. Ontario (Municipal Employees Retirement Board)
(2006), 2006 CarswellOnt 13, [2006] O.J. No. 27, 12 B.L.R. (4th) 189, 79 O.R. (3d)
81, 263 D.L.R. (4th) 450, 206 O.A.C. 61 (Ont. C.A.); additional reasons at (2006),
2006 CarswellOnt 1526, [2006] O.J. No. 990, 208 O.A.C. 125, 17 B.L.R. (4th) 169
(Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal refused [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 77, 2006 CarswellOnt 5134,
2006 CarswellOnt 5135, [2006] 2 S.C.R. x, 267 D.L.R. (4th) ix, 225 O.A.C. 400 (note),
358 N.R. 393 (note) (S.C.C.).
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assailing the stock options granted by the company. The suit, which was filed in
Ontario in January 2007, was settled in a matter of months in October 2007.99
There has been a practice among Canadian pension funds to file lawsuits
against Canadian corporations in United States courts. They were able to do so
since the securities were listed on American stock exchanges. OTPP, which appears
to be particularly fond of action in the United States, has stated that it trades securi-
ties on New York Stock Exchange, rather than Toronto Stock Exchange, as that
would enable it to litigate in the United States if necessary. The following are some
examples of the OTPP’s legal action in the United States.
• Suit against Nortel — settled by Nortel with a payment of nearly $2.5
billion to the investors including OTPP.100
• Suit against Biovail Corporation — settled in December 2007 for $138
million.101
The preference for United States courts can be potentially explained by the
perception that Canadian courts are less effective in dealing with misconduct in the
capital markets. This can make investors reluctant to file actions in Canada.102
There is evidence of similar reservations about Canadian regulators and effective
enforcement by them.103
John Chapman (2007) expects significant changes in the litigation scene in the
coming years. A variety of factors, Chapman argues, are likely to alter the picture
and lead to increased investor litigation in Canada. Among the factors noted by
Chapman are the increased presence of American institutional investors in Canada,
the rise of entrepreneurial lawyers and success fee engagements and the oppression
remedy in Canadian corporate law.104
American studies on litigation by institutional investors and its efficacy have
found divergent results. According to Keith Johnson (1997), institutional investors
are best suited for the task of deterring corporate fraud through securities litiga-
tion.105 Their large shareholdings provide a powerful incentive for taking action,
and institutional investors also have the advantages of sophistication and expertise.
Michael Perino (2006) found that securities class actions initiated by pension funds
99 Catherine McLean, “RIM suit settled; stock surges 11%” The Globe and Mail (6 Octo-
ber 2006) B9.
100 Catherine McLean, “Nortel pays big to settle lawsuits” The Globe and Mail (9 Feb.
2006) B1.
101 Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, news release, “Teachers’ announces $138 million Bi-
ovail settlement” (December 11, 2007), online: <http://www.otpp.com/wps/wcm/ con-
nect/otpp_en/home/newsroom/news+releases/2007/teachers+announces+%24138+
million+biovail+settlement>.
102 See e.g., Madelaine Drohan, “Canada’s corporate crime capers” The Globe and Mail
(23 June 2005) A23.
103 Poonam Puri, “Enforcement Effectiveness in the Canadian Capital Markets” (June
2005) Capital Markets Institute, Joseph Rotman School of Business, University of
Toronto.
104 Chapman, supra, n. 96.
105 Keith L. Johnson, “Deterrence of corporate fraud through securities litigation: the role
of institutional investors” (1997) 60 Law. & Contemp. Probs. 155.
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were more effective in procuring settlements than those initiated by other classes of
plaintiffs.106 The higher success rate of institutional investors in litigation affirms
Keith Johnson’s thesis about their ability to bring effective action.
On the flip side, a study by James Cox and Randall Thomas (2002) detected
negligence and apathy in many institutional investors. Their managers failed to file
claims in the securities class actions initiated by others.107 This suggests that insti-
tutional investors did not keep track of the lawsuits brought by others and did not
take action to ensure that their funds benefited from the suits. This is a signal to the
pension funds to keep track of events in their investee-corporations. It is not ade-
quate if they bring legal action in cases they consider appropriate; they must also
participate in the lawsuits brought by other shareholders.
(iii) Shareholder Proposals
The mechanism of shareholder proposals enables shareholders to raise the is-
sues they consider important and have them voted on.108 This part of the article
reviews how pension funds have used the facility. Shareholder Association for Re-
search and Education (“SHARE”) maintains a database of shareholder resolutions
from 2000.109 Five pension funds figure in the database as filers of shareholder
proposals. The pension funds and the number of proposals filed by them since 2000
are given below.
• American Federation of State, Municipal and Federal Employees (1)
• Carpenters Local 27 Pension Trust (82)
• Pension Plan for the Employees of Ontario Public Service Employees
Union (2)
• Public Service Alliance of Canada Staff Pension Fund (1)
• United Association of Canadian Pipeline Industry National Pension Trust
(1)
Arguably, Carpenters Local 27 Pension Trust is the most activist. It has been
quite prolific in submitting shareholder proposals, and the issues have ranged from
auditor independence (George Weston Ltd. 2003) and executive compensation
(Nortel, 2007) to majority vote for director elections (Nexen Inc., 2008) and en-
hanced voting rights for long-term shareholders (Sun Life Financial Inc., 2008).110
Carpenters Local was able to achieve the highest level of support, between 38
to 42 percent, for its proposals on executive pay in 2007. For other proposals, the
106 Michael A. Perino, “Institutional Activism through Litigation: An Empirical Analysis
of Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions” (October 2006). St.
John’s Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-0055, online:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=938722>.
107 James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, “Leaving money on the table: do institutional
investors fail to file claims in securities class actions?” (2002) 80 Wash. U. L. Q 855.
108 Canada Business Corporations Act, Section 137.
109 Shareholder Association for Research and Education (SHARE), Shareholder Resolu-
tion Database, online: <http://www.share.ca/en/shareholderdb>.
110 The proposals for enhanced voting rights for long-term shareholders in companies with
multiple voting structures were withdrawn by the Carpenters Pension Trust. Ibid.
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level of shareholder support has been quite low — usually less than 30 percent.
Shareholder support was as little as 0.6 percent for a proposal that Carpenters Local
submitted to Loblaws Companies Ltd. for adopting a “common sense executive
compensation program.” Carpenters Local also withdrew a number of proposals it
submitted.
In comparison with Carpenters Local, the other pension funds found in
SHARE database have not been very active.
• The proposal submitted by American Federation of State, Municipal and
Federal Employees to Merrill Lynch Canada in 2006 was for shareholder
approval of compensation committee reports. Level of shareholder sup-
port for the proposal was 35.6 percent.
• In 2003, Pension Plan for the Employees of Ontario Public Service Em-
ployees Union proposed that Sears Canada must adopt ILO labor rights
principles and separation of the chair and chief executive officer. The
level of shareholder support was 7.70 percent and 10 percent,
respectively.
• Public Service Alliance of Canada Staff Pension Fund submitted a propo-
sal in 2008 to Goldcorp Inc. seeking a human rights impact assessment,
but later withdrew the proposal.
• United Association of Canadian Pipeline Industry National Pension
Trust’s proposal to Sun Life Financial Inc. in 2003 was about index stock
options, which garnered 27.8 percent shareholder support.
SHARE data do not suggest that pension funds have actively used the share-
holder proposal mechanism. None of the resolutions were able to generate majority
support. The data support the view of Gil Yaron (2005) that pension funds are not
generally active in initiating shareholder proposals.111 Yaron (2005) also noted that
most pension funds do not explicitly state their policy on engagement with the cor-
porations.112 Here again, a possible explanation is the preference for resolving is-
sues through informal negotiations.
A study of shareholder proposals initiated by pension funds provides interest-
ing results. It found that their impact on share prices was negative; there was de-
cline in the prices of the shares of corporations with which pension funds engaged.
The fall was transitory prices for corporations that were only targeted once during
the sample period, but more enduring for corporations subject to repeated share-
holder proposals from pension funds.113 If these results are any indication, it would
be unwise for pension funds to engage with the corporations lest they trigger a slide
in share prices.
Examining shareholder proposals from a different lens — namely, human
rights and social responsibility, Aaron Dhir was optimistic about pension fund in-
111 Yaron, supra, n. 22.
112 Ibid.
113 Andrew K. Prevost & Ramesh P. Rao, “Of What Value are Shareholder Proposals
Sponsored by Public Pension Funds?” (1999), online:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=177268>.
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tervention.114 Reviewing the experience with shareholder proposals and their po-
tential to encourage responsible corporate behavior, Dhir concluded: 
At the level of pressure and engagement, there is cause to be optimistic
given the increased use of the shareholder proposal mechanism in the post-
Canada Business Corporations Act (“CBCA”)115 amendment period. While
the trend is still in its infancy, it appears that the submission process, and the
resulting dialogue between proposing shareholders and management, has
begun to play a role in the formulation of corporate policy with respect to
HRSP issues. This is especially the case where shareholders have with-
drawn their proposals after concluding successful negotiations with
management.116
In Canada, shades of social concerns are visible in the proposals initiated by
some pension funds referred to earlier.
(iv) Proxy Voting
Voting rights are an essential attribute of shareholding, and this part examines
how pension funds deal with their voting rights. The evidence from a recent survey
reveals that although most funds issue instructions to their fund managers on proxy
voting, the trend is to vote with the managements.
The guidelines developed by the CCGG and PIAC do not deal directly with
the issue of proxy votes and their use. In the recent years, SHARE has conducted
annual Proxy Vote Surveys, which examine the how fund managers deal with the
votes attached to the investments under their management. According to SHARE,
the survey “is intended to give pension fund trustees information that will help
them carry out their fiduciary duty to oversee how the votes attached to their funds’
equity assets are voted.”117
Out of the 62 fund managers that SHARE approached, 32 participated in the
survey. The participating firms had a total of $452.7 billion under their manage-
ment.118 This is a sizable part of the universe of pension funds and the results of
the survey provide useful information on the current trends. Viewed from the lens
of shareholder activism, the latest survey provides mixed results. On the one hand,
there is a decline in pension fund passivity. Progressively, there has been a fall in
the percentage of pension funds that leave their fund managers free to vote accord-
ing to their choice. This is evident from the chart below.119
114 Aaron Dhir, “Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder Proposals as a
Vehicle for Achieving Corporate Social and Human Rights Accountability” (2006) 43
Am. Bus. L. J. 365.
115 Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S., 1985, c. C-44, s. 1; 1994, c. 24, s. 1(F).
116 Supra, n. 114 at 412.
117 Key Proxy Vote Survey (2008) at 5, online: Shareholders Association for Research and
Education (SHARE) <http://www.share.ca/files/SHARE_2008_Key_ProxyVote_
Survey.pdf>.
118 Ibid., at 10. Significantly, the value of Canadian equities component in the funds of the
participating managers was just $44.8 billion, or less than 10 percent of the total.
119 Ibid., at 6.
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Chart 9
Fund Managers with Freedom to Determine Voting, 2003-08
The trend is quite consistent. The percentage of pension funds that do not pro-
vide instructions to their managers has fallen from almost 90 in 2003 to just over 60
in 2008. Still, there is a large majority of pension funds that simply do not get
involved with voting their shares. A possible explanation could be lack of resources
and expertise, especially for the smaller funds. Gil Yaron (2005) identified a num-
ber of legal and other barriers that impede the effective exercise of voting rights by
pension funds. These include lack of confidential proxy voting, the practice of sell-
ing voting rights, free-rider problems and rational apathy. To address these
problems, Yaron has advocated a five-step fiduciary process to oversee proxy
voting.120
Another significant trend revealed in the SHARE survey of 2008 is that “par-
ticipating firms appear to be voting according to the recommendations of corporate
management more often than they have in the recent past.”121 This suggests that
the interest of the pension funds in voting their shares is mostly of the passive
variety. SHARE has added a caveat that “no definitive interpretation of these re-
sults [that is, voting with managements] can be made without a better understand-
ing of firms’ reasons.”122 In any case, the result is consistent with the preference of
the funds for a relational approach that eschews confrontations.
The SHARE survey provides information on the level of interaction between
fund managers and pension fund trustees on proxy voting. The following data sug-
gest the trends.123
120 Yaron, supra, n. 22.
121 SHARE, supra, n. 116 at 6.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid., at 11.
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Table 10 Proxy Voting - Interaction between Pension Funds and Fund 
Managers (Percentage) 
2008 2007 2006 
Fund managers with proxy voting 
guidelines 94 97 91 
Fund managers that consult clients in 
developing voting guidelines 39 55 53 
Firms that report to clients about their 
proxy voting 94 100 97 
An overwhelming majority of fund managers have proxy voting guidelines. 
Similarly a huge majority of managers report to their clients about proxy voting. 
But the evidence on client participation in the development of voting guidelines is 
weak. At the peak in 2007, just 55 percent of the fund managers consulted their 
clients in formulating the proxy guidelines. This suggests a lack of serious concern, 
both among pension fund trustees and fund managers, for the issue of proxy voting. 
5. PENSION FUNDS - ROLE IN SHAPING POLICY AND 
REGULATORY CHANGES 
Pension funds have been increasingly active in shaping policy and influencing 
regulatory changes. This part of the article reviews recent experience and draws the 
following conclusions. 
As large investors, pension funds have been both active and effective in 
campaigning for changes in corporate and securities regulation. The 
amendments made to the proxy rules in the CBCA in 2001 and the re-
moval of the Foreign Property Rule from the Income Tax Act124 in 2005 
are prominent examples of successful campaigns by pension funds. 
Pension fund campaigns for policy and regulatory changes are conducted 
at the collective level by agencies such as CCGG and PIAC. Other than 
this, large pension funds such as CPPIB and OTPP undertake individual 
efforts. 
The trend for pension fund involvement in shaping policy and stimulating reg-
ulatory changes is likely to continue. An important ongoing campaign is for the 
removal of the investment rules applicable to pension funds under the federal Pen-
sion Benefits Standards Regulations, 1985.125 
124 ITA, supra, n. 18. 
125 SOR/87-19, s. 6. 
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(a) Pension Fund Activism in Shaping Policy — A Review
In the recent years, pension funds have actively campaigned with government
authorities and the stock exchange and influenced policy on a number of issues.
Between November 1997 and October 2007, PIAC submitted a total of 44 repre-
sentations to various governmental bodies, public agencies and self-regulating or-
ganizations — mainly, stock exchanges.126 At this writing in July 2009, PIAC has
made another 23 submissions since October 2007.127 This indicates an increase in
activism by PIAC in the recent years. The agencies to which PIAC has made sub-
missions include Bank of Canada, Federal Department of Finance, Canadian Secur-
ities Administrators, United States Securities and Exchange Commission and To-
ronto Stock Exchange.
PIAC’s submissions cover a broad range of subjects related to the capital mar-
kets. The following is a sample of the issues covered by PIAC:
• The role of institutional investors (November 1997).
• Statutory remedy for investors in the secondary market (November
1998).
• Small business investment (December 1999).
• Foreign Property Rule (January 1999 and November 2002).
• Income trusts (December 2005).
• Executive compensation, continuous disclosure and corporate governance
practices (June 2007).
• Toronto Stock Exchange rules on dilution of shares (December 2007).
• Securities regulation (July 2008).
• Solvency relief for pension plans (February 2009).
CCGG ranks second in the number of submissions. Since 2003, it has made a
total of 31 submissions on issues relevant for corporate governance, securities mar-
kets and investors. The representations were submitted to agencies such as Industry
Canada, Canadian Securities Administrators and Toronto Stock Exchange.128
Other than collective submissions by the networks, large pension funds have
made individual efforts. A good example is submission of responses to regulatory
proposals mooted by Ontario Securities Commission (“OSC”). Between 2005 and
2007, CPPIB and OTPP made five submissions to OSC. Statement of executive
compensation and registration requirements were among the issues covered in the
representations.
The data are evidence of pension fund activism in the formulation of policy on
issues that affect them as shareholders in corporations, investors in the capital mar-
kets and providers of pension. Two prominent examples of pension funds’ success
in achieving regulatory change are the amendments to proxy rule in the CBCA in
126 List of submissions made by Pension Investment Association of Canada from Novem-
ber 1997 till October 2007, online: Pension Investment Association of Canada
<http://www.piacweb.org/submissions.html>.
127 Ibid.
128 Complete submissions of Canadian Coalition for Good Governance, online:
<http://www.ccgg.ca/submissions/>.
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2001 and the deletion of the Foreign Property Rule in 2005. These are discussed
below.
(i) Proxy Rules
Before 2001, the proxy rules in the CBCA discouraged communication among
shareholders. The rules were not clear whether communications among the share-
holders would trigger the complex proxy procedures that required the shareholders
to send out, at their expense, proxy circulars to all other shareholders. The ambigu-
ity in the proxy rules, which had been a prominent and longstanding issue, ham-
pered pension funds from coordination in casting their votes in corporations. A
good example of the difficulties is seen in the case of OTPP. OTPP had adopted the
practice of announcing how it planned to cast its votes — a practice that would
enhance its effectiveness as a large shareholder. But it was advised against doing
so, and discontinued the practice.129
When Industry Canada proposed amendments to the CBCA, inter alia, to relax
the proxy rules and encourage communications among shareholders, PIAC sup-
ported the amendments.130 The proxy rules were amended in 2001.131 The regula-
tions introduced subsequently set out the conditions under which shareholders can
communicate among themselves without triggering the dissident proxy circular re-
quirement. They also define the circumstances in which a person may solicit prox-
ies by public broadcast without sending a dissident’s proxy circular.132 The new
regime is designed to facilitate shareholder communication and coordination,
which in turn can promote shareholder participation in corporate governance. There
would be no difficulty for pension funds to work in unison and coordinate the exer-
cise of their voting rights.
(ii) Foreign Property Rule
The limit on foreign assets, which had been increased from 10 percent to 20
percent in 1994, was raised to 30 percent in 2001. Since 1999, PIAC actively cam-
paigned for the deletion of the Foreign Property Rule. It engaged scholars to pro-
vide a cost-benefit analysis of the rule, and published their study in November
2002.133 The study showed that there was hardly any net benefit from the Foreign
Property Rule. The sustained efforts of pension funds bore fruit in 2005 when the
Foreign Property Rule was finally abolished. This is an illustration that pension
funds pay close attention to the policy issues that affect them and are willing to
devote energy and resources to bring about regulatory changes.
129 See Church, supra, n. 86.
130 Regulatory Impact Statement — Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA), Bill S-11
(September 2005), online: Industry Canada <http://www.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/cd-
dgc.nsf/en/cs01381e.html#consultations>.
131 CBCA, Sections 147 to 153.
132 Canada Business Corporations Regulations, SOR/2001-512, Sections 54 to 69.
133 Burgess & Reid, supra, n. 20.
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(iii) Investment Rules — An Unfinished Task
The federal Pension Benefits Standards Regulations, 1985134 lay down quanti-
tative limits for individual investments by pension funds. They impose a ceiling of
30 percent on pension funds’ holding of voting stock in corporations. This defines
the position of pension funds as passive investors who cannot have a decisive say
in the corporations.135
The quantitative limits on shareholding have been viewed with increasing dis-
favour the by pension funds who have called for the removal of the limits. This is
consistent with the trend for new investment such as private equity and venture
capital and business acquisitions by pension funds. At least since 2007, pension
funds have been campaigning for the removal of the restrictions on holding voting
shares in corporations. According to a report “several of Canada’s biggest pension
funds [were] urging the government to scrap a two-decades-old rule that they say
puts them at a disadvantage in takeovers, complicates investing strategies and has
forced them to walk away from deals.”136 Referring to the investment trends
among the funds, the report added: 
Over time, pension funds have developed complex financial structures to
get around the control limit imposed by the 30-per-cent rule so that they can
protect their investments. But creating these structures is time consuming,
costly to set up and can make the funds less competitive in bids because
rival bidders in other countries don’t come to the table with the same bag-
gage, which one pension fund manager described as akin to attaching condi-
tions to an offer on a house.
Deborah Allen, a spokesperson for OTPP, is reported to have stated: 
[The restrictive rule] means we have to put resources against managing
around [the rule] rather than using the resources to increase our investment
value.
The report noted that the call for removal of investment limits came “at a time
when Canada’s public sector pension funds, the custodians of hundreds of billions
of retirement dollars, are becoming active, heavyweight investors in both public
and private equity markets.”137 In this climate, it is understandable that pension
funds find the ceilings on investments suffocating. OMERS also supported the de-
mands for the removal of the rule and sought its suspension while the issue is under
134 Supra, n. 125.
135 This was the theme of the policy recommendations dated July 4, 1986 published by the
Pension Commission of Ontario for the regulation of pension fund investments. These
recommendations played a role in the present regime of portfolio investments by pen-
sion funds, and are cited in the submissions made by the Canadian Bar Association on
the recommendations. Canadian Bar Association-Ontario, “Submission to the Pension
Commission of Ontario Respecting Policy Recommendations for the Regulation of
Pension Fund Investments” September 16, 1986, Toronto.
136 Nicole Mordant, “Pension funds want ‘bizarre’ rule retired” The Globe and Mail (17
July 2007) B4.
137 Ibid.
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consideration.138 OMERS argued that the rule resulted in loss of investment oppor-
tunities for Canadian pension funds and that the opportunities instead went to for-
eign investors.
At this writing in July 2009, the investment rules are still on the statute book.
Given the current climate of recession and developments such as the failure of
OTPP’s effort to takeover Bell Canada, it is not clear how actively the pension
funds are pursuing their agenda for abolition of the restrictions on their invest-
ments. In any event, pension fund participation in shaping policy and regulation
continues. Indeed, it has strengthened in the recent years if one is to be guided by
the number and frequency of submissions that CCGG and PIAC have made to pub-
lic authorities.
6. CONCLUSION
It is now more than 30 years since Peter Drucker proclaimed the socialist
revolution by pension funds. Around the same time activism by pension funds
started, albeit in a small way. Pension funds have gradually increased their engage-
ment with business corporations and made efforts to promote good governance. As
investors with long-term perspectives and large shareholders, pension funds occupy
a significant position in the economic framework.139 Given their increased engage-
ment with the corporations and their special advantages, pension funds are well-
placed to play the role of responsible shareholders.140 Responsible shareholder ac-
tivism by pension funds can be valuable in promoting the twin objectives of good
governance and long-term value.
The deflation in share prices, if it persists, is likely to goad pension funds
towards greater shareholder activism and deeper engagement with the corporations.
The turbulence in the stock market underscores the risks in relying excessively on
trade in securities for funding pension obligations. To strengthen their revenue
base, an option for pension funds would be to strive for a better revenue mix from
sources such as dividends. This shift would necessarily mean greater involvement
in the governance, business and strategy of the investee-corporations.141
Recently, there is evidence of more innovation in pension fund investments.
Pension funds were among the sellers of credit default swaps that were prominent
138 Janet McFarland, “OMERS wants restrictions lifted” The Globe and Mail (20 October
2007) B9.
139 Recently, calls for deliberated and enhanced activism by pension funds have come
from Hawley & Williams, supra, n. 1, and Gordon L. Clark, Pension Fund Capitalism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
140 See generally Tessa Hebb, No Small Change: Pension Funds and Corporate Engage-
ment (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008).
141 Hutchinson, supra, n. 78, has categorized the shareholder practices of OTPP, OMERS
and Caisse de depot et placement du Quebec as “constrained activism.” Given the real-
ity of deficits, share price deflation and the imperatives of meeting pension liabilities, it
would be a challenge for the pension funds to balance them with other equally valid
issues — social, environmental and the like.
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in the credit crisis.142 During the spike in oil prices during 2008, speculation was
considered an important factor. Here again, pension fund investments in the oil
futures market were cited among the reasons for the spurt in oil prices.143 It is not
clear if Canadian funds invested in default swaps or oil futures.
This paper will be incomplete without a reference to the recent high-profile,
abortive effort of OTPP to lead a consortium of investors for a leveraged buyout of
Bell Canada. The episode affirms the trend of large pension funds seeking increas-
ingly active roles as investors. Ironically, this trend might strengthen if the bear
phase in the stock market continues. With a fall in the gains from share price in-
creases, pension funds would likely pay greater attention to investment income.
Perforce, their interest in acquisition and management of businesses would be
higher.
This paper is concerned with the impact of pension funds on the capital mar-
kets and corporate governance. The literature and data clearly suggest that pension
funds are becoming more activist — both in venturing into new classes of assets
and in engaging with the investee-corporations. In particular larger pension funds,
with their advantages of greater resources and expertise, are more dynamic in mak-
ing new investments and in engaging with the corporations. It would be useful to
explore policy initiatives that can facilitate smaller pension funds also to play a
more active and meaningful role. As a major force in the capital markets, pension
funds are also proactive in shaping policy and regulation.
The impact of pension funds on the general economy is a significant area for
future research. This article has not ventured into that. More specifically, the im-
pact of pension funds on vital issues such as innovation in the economy, training of
the workforce — semi-skilled, skilled and elite — and employment generally are
green fields for further research and analysis. Yet another area that can be fruitfully
explored is the role of pension funds in encouraging financial services innovation. 
142
“The great untangling,” The Economist (6 November 2008), online:
<http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12552204>.
According to the report, pension funds provided 4 percent of the outstanding swaps
whose total was estimated at US$62.2 trillion.
143 See e.g., Moira Herbst, “Are Pension Funds Fueling High Oil?” Business Week (21
May 2008), online: <http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/may2008/
db20080520_524455.htm>.
